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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)G) (2003).
THE PARTIES
The parties that are germane to this appeal include Plaintiffs Jack G. Charlesworth,
Rennly J. Charlesworth, Jace Martinson, Gaylee C. McEwan, and Mirid Weidner
(collectively "Charlesworths"), and Defendants Ruth C. Reyns, individually ("Defendant
Reyns"), and Ruth C. Reyns, Arie William Reyns, and Alan W. Reyns, as joint trustees
under the Reyns Family Trust Agreement dated August 27, 1985 ("Reyns Family Trust")
(collectively "Reynses").
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Whether the district court was correct in ruling as a matter of law that, in

light of the material undisputed facts in this case, an accounting was not a prerequisite to
the Charles worths' action. (R. at 526.)
2.

Whether the district court was correct in ruling as a matter of law that, in

light of the material undisputed facts in this case, the Charles worths' claims for breach of
contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and conversion were not barred by the applicable
statutes of limitation. (R. at 527-32.)
Both of these issues were determined by the district court on summary judgment.
Accordingly, the district court's rulings are reviewed for correctness. Prince, Yeates &
Geldzahler v. Young, 2004 UT 26, H 10, 94 P.3d 179. In reviewing the grant or denial of
a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the facts and all reasonable inferences
1

therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Surety Underwriters v. E
& C Trucking, Inc., 2000 UT 71, U 10 P.3d 338.
As explained below, this matter is before the Court in the context of cross-motions
for summary judgment. The trial court granted the Charlesworths' motion for summary
judgment on four of their affirmative claims (breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty,
conversion, and constructive trust). The trial court denied the Reynses' cross-motion for
summary judgment, which cross motion contended that the Charles worths' affirmative
claims failed for lack of satisfying a supposed prerequisite of an accounting and because
the claims were in any event barred by the applicable statutes of limitation.
The Reynses have appealed the denial of their cross-motion. They appeal the trial
court's entry of summary judgment on the Charles worths' affirmative claims, but only to
the extent of the Reynses' contention that those claims are barred by a failure to obtain an
accounting and by the applicable statutes of limitation. The Reynses do not otherwise
appeal the substantive propriety of the trial court's entry of summary judgment against
them on the Charles worths' motion for summary judgment.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
The statutes determinative of this appeal are provided in the Addendum attached
to this brief at Tab A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF THE CASE
The Charlesworths and Defendant Reyns were partners, along with Ellen Isom.

The sole asset of the partnership consisted of a small apartment complex, known as the
2

Charlesworth Court, located in Ogden, Utah. The Charlesworths contend that, among
other things, Defendant Reyns breached contractual and fiduciary duties owed to them,
and engaged in conversion, by clandestinely transferring the Charlesworths5 interest in
the apartments into the Reyns Family Trust, later selling that interest to a third party, and
retaining the Charlesworths' share of the proceeds, all unbeknownst to the Charlesworths.
The Charlesworths contend that the Reynses affirmatively concealed their actions.
II.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW
Upon learning of these misdeeds, the Charlesworths brought this action against

Defendant Reyns individually, and against Defendants Reyns, Arie William Reyns, and
Alan W. Reyns as joint trustees of the Reyns Family Trust. The Charlesworths variously
asserted the following claims in their Amended Complaint against the Reynses: (1)
breach of written contract; (2) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing; (3) breach of fiduciary duty; (4) mesne profits; (5) conversion; (6) fraud; (7)
conspiracy to convert and defraud; (8) fraudulent conveyance; and (9) accounting and
constructive trust. (R. at 33-34, 42-51.)
After conducting discovery, the Charlesworths moved for summary judgment on
four of their claims: the first, breach of contract; the third, breach of fiduciary duty; the
fifth, conversion; and a portion of the ninth, constructive trust. (Id. at 178-80.) The
Reynses filed a cross-motion for summary judgment asserting that all of the
Charlesworths' claims were time barred. (Id. at 336-37.) After extensive briefing and
oral argument, the trial court granted the Charlesworths' motion, and denied the Reynses'

3

cross-motion, as a matter of law in a Ruling, which was later memorialized in a detailed
Order dated September 25, 2002. (Id. at 492-96, 506-33.)
Thereafter, in an effort to streamline the matter and bring it to conclusion, the
Charlesworths moved the trial court to dismiss the claims and defendants that were not
the subject of the summary judgment order, with prejudice, and to enter judgment. (Id. at
539-47.) Importantly, the Reynses did not oppose this motion or the form of the
accompanying proposed order of dismissal or the form of the proposed judgment.
On May 4, 2004, based on the Charlesworths' unopposed motion, the trial court
entered an order dismissing the claims and the parties that were not the subject of the
summary judgment order. (Id. at 568-71.) On the same day, the court entered Judgment
in favor of the Charlesworths and against Defendant Reyns, individually, and against
Defendants Reyns, Arie William Reyns, and Alan W. Reyns as joint trustees of the Reyns
Family Trust, jointly and severally, in the principal sum of $116,666.67, together with
pre- and post-judgment interest on that sum. (Id. at 572-75.) The Court further imposed
a constructive trust on the proceeds of the sale of the Charlesworth Court apartments that
were paid to the Reyns Family Trust. (Id. at 574.) The Reynses appeal from this
Judgment.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In the factual statement of Appellees' opening brief, the Reynses claim that the
trial court mistakenly concluded that the material facts were undisputed for purposes of
summary judgment. (Appellees' Br. at 6.) However, a review of the facts submitted to
the trial court demonstrates that the Reynses failed to contest the vast majority of the
4

Charlewsorths' statements of fact in any way. In fact, the Reynses specifically admitted
the majority of those facts for purposes of summary judgment. Even those few facts that
the Reynses purported to dispute in their summary judgment memoranda do not in fact
create a material issue of disputed fact. To illustrate these points, and for the
convenience of the Court, the Charlesworths have attached to this brief at Tab B to the
Addendum a chart containing the parties' statements of fact submitted in their summary
judgment briefing to the trial court. Below is a streamlined version of those facts as they
pertain to this appeal.
I.

INTRODUCTION
This matter involves an arrangement created in 1963 by Ben and Margaret

Charles worth ("Mr. and Mrs. Charles worth") for two of their children and for certain of
their grandchildren. Under this plan, their daughter Defendant Reyns, their daughter
Ellen Isom ("Isom"), and the then-minor children of their son Jack Charlesworth (the
Charlesworths), with his wife Shirlie Charlesworth acting as the children's trustee,
formed a partnership called Ruell Investment Co. (the "Partnership") and purchased an
apartment complex in Ogden, Utah, owned by Mr. and Mrs. Charlesworth
("Charlesworth Court" or the "apartments"). Reyns, Isom, and the children (originally
through their mother as trustee and later directly), each owned a one-third share in the
Partnership, the principal assets of which were the apartments and the contract through
which they were purchased. This relationship was created by three primary documents,
all executed on March 22, 1963: a contract, a partnership agreement, and a trust
agreement. Each is explained below.
5

II.

THE CONTRACT
On March 22, 1963, Reyns and Isom entered into a contract for the purchase of the

apartments from Mr. and Mrs. Charlesworth (the "Contract"). (R. at 187-88, 34-35, 6465, 139, 214-17, 223.) Pursuant to the terms thereof, Reyns held a two-thirds interest in
the Contract, and Isom held a one-third interest in the Contract. {Id. at 188, 215, 139.)
However, the Contract expressly permitted Reyns to convey one-half of her interest
therein to Shirlie Charlesworth in trust for the benefit of her children. {Id. at 188, 217.)
III.

THE PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT
Also on March 22, 1963, Reyns and Isom entered into an agreement creating the

Partnership (the "Partnership Agreement"). {Id. at 188, 35, 65, 139, 227-28, 223.) As
their initial capital contributions to the Partnership, Reyns and Isom each assigned their
respective interests in the Contract to the Partnership. {Id. at 189, 139.) The Partnership
Agreement expressly stated Reyns's intent to transfer one-half of her interest in the
Contract to Shirlie Charlesworth (as trustee for her children). {Id. at 189, 227.) The
Partnership Agreement also documented Reyns and Isom's consent to the transfer and
provided that Shirlie Charlesworth would take her interest as trustee subject to the
Partnership Agreement. {Id.) The Partnership Agreement specifically provided that,
after the transfer, Reyns, Isom, and the trustee would each own one-third of the Contract.
(Id.)
Reyns was designated the managing partner, and was required to operate and
manage the property, collect rents from tenants, keep financial records, not commingle
partnership funds with any other funds, and at least annually disburse profits in excess of
6

the obligations of the Partnership (including its payment obligations under the Contract)
to the partners according to their respective interests in the Partnership. {Id. at 188-89,
227-28, 5, 139.) However, Reyns was given the discretion to determine the portion of
profits to be distributed and the portion to be retained by the Partnership. {Id. at 189,
228.) During the entirety of the Partnership, the Contract (until it was paid off) and the
Property purchased thereunder were the Partnership's principal assets. {Id. at 189, 139.)
IV.

THE TRUST AGREEMENT
As contemplated by the Contract and the Partnership Agreement, Reyns

transferred one-half of her interest in the Contract to Shirlie Charlesworth, as trustee,
through a Trust Agreement and Contract Assignment, which was also executed March
22, 1963 (the "Trust Agreement"). {Id. at 189, 230-33, 223.) The Trust Agreement
stated that by accepting the trust and the rights and duties of trustee, Shirlie Charlesworth,
as trustee, became a partner in the Partnership, owning an equal one-third interest. {Id. at
190, 230.) The Trust Agreement further provided that as a result of the assignment,
Reyns, Isom, and Shirlie Charlesworth as trustee, each owned an undivided one-third
interest in the Contract. {Id. at 189, 230.)
The trust was to terminate by its own terms upon the happening of certain
contingencies, including the satisfaction of the payment obligations under the Contract
and/or when the beneficiaries attained their majority. {Id. at 190, 231.) Regardless of
how the Trust was to terminate, the end result was that the beneficiaries or the heirs of
any non-surviving beneficiaries were to own, among other things, their respective
portions of the trust principal. {Id.) As it turned out, the payment obligation under the
7

Contract was not satisfied until after all of the beneficiaries turned 21. (Id. at 190, 23637, 38, 68, 139.) In that instance, "all allocated income and all of the interest in the trust
principal shall be or have been distributed to the beneficiaries free and clear of the trust."
(Id. at 190, 231 (emphasis added).) Thus, as the Charlesworths attained their majority,
the Trust Agreement by its terms terminated as to them and they owned their share of the
trust principal, i.e., the Partnership, directly. (Id. at 373.) Reyns recognized this fact by
making distributions directly to the Charlesworths once they had attained their majority
and by reciting that they were partners in the Federal Schedule K-ls she sent them. (Id.)
Given that the Charlesworths owned their interest in the Partnership directly, and the
Trust Agreement had terminated by its own terms, Shirlie Charlesworth's duty to protect
her children's interest in the trust extinguished.1
V.

ESCROW DOCUMENTS
The Contract required several documents to be placed in escrow at Commercial

Security Bank in Ogden, Utah, including the following: a copy of the Contract; an
escrow agreement executed contemporaneously with the Contract; and a Warranty Deed

1

Shirlie Charlesworth testified in her deposition that the entire arrangement concerning
the Partnership, the Contract, and the Trust Agreement had been set up by Mr.
Charlesworth and his lawyer, and that she did not participate in the arrangements. Mr.
Charlesworth presented her with the Trust Agreement in his lawyer's office, and
explained to her that the arrangement was for his grandchildren, to help with college. He
further explained that the Charlesworths would own one-third of the apartments. He then
asked Shirlie to sign the Trust Agreement, and she gratefully did. Mr. Charlesworth did
not show her any other documents related to the transaction, such as the Partnership
Agreement or the Quitclaim Deed. Specifically, Shirlie Charlesworth was never aware of
the existence of the Quitclaim Deed until around the time this suit was filed. (Id. at 37374.)
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to the Property, conveying the Property from Mr. and Mrs. Charles worth to Reyns and
Isom, which Warranty Deed was to be delivered to Reyns and Isom upon completion of
the payments required under the Contract. (Id. at 190, 216-17, 35, 65, 139.)
The Contract further provided that, in the event Reyns conveyed one-half of her
interest in the Contract to Shirlie Charlesworth, as trustee, prior to the delivery of the
documents in escrow to Reyns and Isom - which Reyns did - "the trust deed from . . .
Reyns to Shirlee [sic] Charlesworth shall also be deposited in escrow and held by the
escrow agent until the total purchase price has been paid in full." (Id. at 191, 217.) The
Trust Agreement echoed and clarified the Contract's dictate. The Trust Agreement
provided: "To further carry out this assignment the Settlor [Reyns] has executed her Quit
Claim Deed to an undivided one-third of the trust property in favor of Trustee [Shirlie
Charlesworth], which deed shall be deposited in escrow with the escrow holder named in
the contract assigned and held by it until the contract principal is paid in full, at which
time it will be delivered by the escrow holder to the Trustee and by her recorded." (Id. at
191,233.)
Consistent with the Contract and the Trust Agreement, the Escrow Agreement
provided that when the Contract purchase price was paid in full, the Warranty Deed
conveying the Property from Mr. and Mrs. Charlesworth to Reyns and Isom shall be
delivered to Reyns and Isom, and "the Quit Claim Deed from Ruth C. Reyns to Shirlee
[sic] Charlesworth . . . shall be delivered to the Grantee therein," namely Shirlie
Charlesworth. (Id. at 191, 221, 240.)

9

The Quit Claim Deed bears Reyns's signature. In that Deed, Reyns grants an
undivided one-third interest in the Property such that, after recordation of the Quit Claim
Deed, the Property will be owned "an undivided one-third by RUTH C. REYNS, an
undivided one-third by ELLEN C. ISOM, an undivided one-third by SHIRLEE [sic]
CHARLES WORTH, TRUSTEE, as tenants in common." (Id at 192, 220-21, 244-45.)
The Contract purchase price was paid in full on or about October 6, 1983. (Id. at
192, 38, 68, 139.) At that time, the Warranty Deed was delivered to Reyns. (Id. at 192,
247-48.) The Quit Claim Deed was also delivered to Reyns. (Id. at 192, 222, 258, 249.)2
Shirlie Charlesworth and the children never received the Quit Claim Deed. (Id. at 193,
296-97,238.)
VI.

HISTORY OF PARTNERSHIP DISTRIBUTIONS
For twenty years, Reyns paid the net profits from the apartments, if any, to the

partners annually. (Id. at 193, 38, 68.) Reyns paid one-third of the profits to herself, onethird to Isom (and later to her heirs), and one-third to the children. Initially, Reyns
delivered the Charlesworths' portion of the profits to Shirlie Charlesworth's husband,
who would deliver the payments to the children. Reyns began to deliver the payments

2

For the first time in this action, the Reynses suggest in their Appellants' Brief that this
fact was disputed. However, the Charlesworths made that assertion in the fact statement
of their memorandum in support of their motion for summary judgment, and the
Reynses failed to contest it in any way in their opposing memorandum. (R. at 192, 339,
341.) Thus, it is deemed admitted. Moreover, given Reyns's inability to recall whether
or not she received the Quit Claim Deed, and the fact that her authenticated signature on
the escrow receipt evidences such receipt, (id. at 249), Reyns cannot seriously contest
that she received the Quit Claim Deed, and has failed to point to any evidence of record
suggesting that she did not.
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directly to the children as they respectively reached their majority. Reyns continued
making payments to the children until at least 1985 - over ten years after the youngest
child had attained his majority and sixteen years after the oldest child had attained his
majority. {Id. at 193, 251-56, 292.)
Even though she ceased making outright payments to the children, Reyns
continued to send them Schedules K-l of Form 1065, titled "Partner's Share of Income,
Credits, Deductions, Etc.," which reflected income or losses to the children in the form of
increased or decreased capital accounts and also expressly recited their status as "general
partners" in the Partnership. {Id. at 193, 256-57, 299-320.) Reyns provided Schedule K1 tax statements to the partners, including each of the Plaintiffs, from the inception of the
Partnership through the 1992 tax year. {Id. at 194, 264-77, 299-320.) The K-ls also
reflected that each of the Plaintiffs owned one-fifth of one-third (6.67%) of the profits,
losses, and ownership of capital of the Partnership. {Id.)
In connection with the preparation of the Partnership's 1992 tax return, Reyns
recalls having a discussion with the Partnership's accountant about whether the
Charlesworths were general partners of the Partnership. She cannot recall the content of
the conversation, however the accountant thereafter prepared the returns in a manner
expressly reflecting the Charlesworths' interest as general partners, and Reyns delivered
the returns to them. {Id. at 194-95, 270-72.)

11

VII.

REYNS'S CLANDESTINE TRANSFER OF THE CHARLESWORTHS'
INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY TO THE REYNS FAMILY TRUST
On August 27, 1985, notwithstanding the Charles worths' interest in the

Partnership, Reyns conveyed by warranty deed a two-thirds interest in the Property to
herself, Arie William Reyns, and Alan W. Reyns, as joint trustees under the Reyns
Family Trust. (Id. at 195, 323-24, 141-42.) The warranty deed was recorded with the
Weber County Recorder. (Id. at 342.) The joint trustees under the Reyns Family Trust
tendered no consideration to the Partnership in connection with the transfer. (Id. at 195,
39, 69.)
Notwithstanding the requirement in the Partnership Agreement that the
Partnership Agreement not be modified absent the consent of all of the parties thereto and
their successors, Reyns did not obtain authorization from anyone to make the transfer.
(Id. at 195, 228, 142.) Reyns did not give Shirlie Charlesworth or the children notice of
the transfer. (Id. at 195.) In fact, notwithstanding the transfer, Reyns continued to
provide Schedule K-ls to the children, which Schedules reflected the children's
continued interest in the Partnership, the principal assets of which were the Contract and
the Property purchased thereunder. (Id. at 194, 195, 264-77.)
The transfer did not affect Isom's one-third interest in the Partnership Property.
Isom retained her one-third interest in the Property after Reyns transferred the other twothirds interest in the Partnership Property to the Reyns Family Trust. (Id. at 196, 143.)
Isom died in 1988, causing a dissolution of the Partnership, however the partnership was
not wound up. On January 4, 1990, Isom's personal representative and former husband,
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Raymond Isom, executed a deed transferring Isom's one-third interest in the Property to
Raymond Isom, Patrick Isom, and Colleen Findley. (Id. at 196, 40, 70.)
VIII. SALE OF THE PROPERTY UNBEKNOWNST TO THE
CHARLESWORTHS

On or about June 6, 1996, the joint trustees of the Reyns Family Trust and
Raymond Isom, respectively, sold and conveyed the entire Property to third parties. (Id.
at 196, 143, 325-30.) A counter offer included in the Real Estate Purchase Contract
signed by Reyns and her husband Arie William Reyns indicated that that the seller was "a
partnership," namely "Ruell Investments," and clarified that the sale was "subject to the
approval of all partners." (Id. at 196, 285-87, 329.)
The Property was transferred to the buyers through warranty deeds, including a
warranty deed executed by Reyns, Arie William Reyns, and Alan W. Reyns, as trustees
of the Reyns Family Trust. (Id. at 197, 289-91, 332-35.)
The joint trustees of the Reyns Family Trust, Raymond Isom, Patrick Isom, and
Colleen Findley together received consideration from the purchasers of the Property of
$350,000, including cash in the amount of $297,500 and a promissory note in the amount
of $52,500. One-third of the $297,000 cash payment was paid to the Isoms, and the
remainder was paid to the Reyns Family Trust. The buyers later paid the balance of the
purchase price, namely $52,500. The $52,500 was distributed to the Isoms and the Reyns
Family Trust in the same proportion as the initial cash payment, namely one-third of the
payment was made to the Isoms and two-thirds was made to the Reyns Family Trust. (Id.
at 197, 273, 280-82, 325.)
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The joint trustees of the Reyns Family Trust did not obtain authorization from the
Plaintiffs to make this transfer of the Property. (Id. at 197, 41, 71, 282.) Reyns never
gave Shirlie Charlesworth or the Charlesworths notice of the sale of the Property. (Id. at
197, 284-85.) Plaintiffs did not learn of the sale until the summer of 1997. (Id. at 197,
295.) The Reynses have never paid any of the sale proceeds of the Property to the
Charlesworths. (Id. at 197, 42, 72.)
IX.

THE CHARLESWORTHS WERE UNAWARE OF DEFENDANT REYNS'S
TRANSFER OF THE PROPERTY AND THE REYNSES
AFFIRMATIVELY DECEIVED THE CHARLESWORTHS INTO
BELIEVING THAT THE STATUS QUO PREVAILED
The annual partnership distributions continued through at least 1985, which is over

ten years after the youngest of the Charlesworths turned 21. After 1985, the cash
distributions to the Charlesworths largely ceased. However, from that time forward,
there nevertheless were one or two additional cash distributions. (Id. at 341-42, 374-75,
421, 433, 445, 457, 469.)3
Although actual cash distributions ceased over time, Reyns continued sending the
Charlesworths Schedule K-ls. These forms continued to expressly state that the
Charlesworths were partners in the Partnership. The forms also reflected each of the
Charlesworths' share of Partnership distributions for the year. In some years, the forms

3

In their Appellees' Brief, the Reynses take issue with the trial court's finding that it is
undisputed that after 1985 Reyns made one or two cash payments to the Charlesworths.
(Appellees' Br. at 14 n.2.) The Reynses cite a portion of Rennly Charlesworth's
deposition to support this claim. (Id.) However, this portion of his transcript on its face
does not preclude this possibility. Moreover, the Reynses ignore the affidavits
submitted by the remaining Charlesworths, each of which state that there were one or
two cash distributions after that time. (R. at 421, 445, 457, 469.)
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reflected income to the Charles worths. In other years, they reflected a loss. Such income
or loss was reflected in the Charles worths' Partnership capital account balance reported
on the Schedule K-1, which resulted in reportable ordinary income or losses. {Id. at 37778; see, e.g., id. at 422.) Importantly, these statements were delivered annually to the
Charlesworths through the 1992 tax year, which form was delivered in 1993. {Id. at 379;
see, e.g., id. at 423.)
Isom passed away in 1988. The Charlesworths understood that certain of Isom's
family members, including Raymond E. Isom, Patrick Isom, and Colleen Ruth Isom
Findley, inherited or otherwise took control of Isom's one-third interest in the
Partnership, and the Partnership continued. From that time forward, the Charlesworths
understood that Reyns distributed one-third of the partnership income and losses to these
members of Isom's family. {Id. at 378; see, e.g., id. at 422.)
In or around the fall of 1988, the Charlesworths observed that their annual cash
distributions had ceased. Accordingly, Plaintiff GayLee McEwan, now known as
GayLee Drezin, wrote a letter to Reyns seeking an explanation. In response, the
Charlesworths received a letter from Defendant Arie William Reyns. The letter was
dated December 9, 1988. As expressed in this letter, Mr. Reyns apparently took offense
at the contents of GayLee's letter. Nevertheless, Mr. Reyns's letter contained a fair
amount of detail. It explained that property taxes and maintenance costs had been rising.
It also stated that, in light of federal low-income housing being built in the area, Mr.
Reyns had to lower the rent for the Property. Finally, the letter disclosed to the
Charlesworths that he was attempting to sell the Property, but had not received any
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serious offers. (Id. at 378, 440.) The explanation in the letter seemed reasonable and
adequate to the Charles worths. Therefore, they did not inquire of the Reynses any further
concerning the matter. (Id. at 378; see, e.g., id. at 422.)
Subsequently, approximately one year later, the Charlesworths received another
letter from Mr. Reyns's husband concerning the Property. This letter was dated
December 10, 1989. This letter similarly stated that the Partnership had incurred
significant maintenance costs, and that the Property was experiencing a very high
vacancy rate. The letter also noted that the Property was still for sale, but that no one had
made any offers to purchase it. (Id. at 378-79, 466.)
The December 10 letter also confirmed the Charlesworths' understanding that the
Partnership continued after Isom's death. For example, the letter indicated that the
Property was still being maintained and rented. The letter also indicated that the
Partnership had taken out a loan that would be payable over the following four years. It
also specifically noted: "The law here required us to have the property appraised after
[Isom's] death for probate. This cost is $600.00, and is paid for, however it is an expense
that has to be shared." (Id. at 379, 466.) Thus, it indicated that the Charlesworths would
continue to share in the costs borne by the Partnership. (Id. at 379; see, e.g., id. at 423.)
The Charlesworths also recall receiving, from time to time, additional letters or
notes from Defendant Reyns or her husband explaining the amount of their Partnership
distributions. These communications often indicated that the distributions were small in
light of the cost of maintaining the Property. (Id.) During this time, and thereafter, the
Charlesworths continued to receive Schedule K-ls from Defendant Reyns. The K-ls
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expressly recited that they were partners in the Partnership. They also reflected income
and losses added to or subtracted from their Partnership capital accounts. (Id.)
Reyns sent the Schedule K-ls for each tax year through and including 1992. The
Schedule K-l for the tax year 1992 was sent to Plaintiffs in 1993. As of September of
1994, Plaintiffs had not received the Schedule K-l for the 1993 tax year. At that time,
Plaintiff Rennly Charlesworth phoned Reyns and inquired as to when the Charlesworths
would be receiving their Schedule K-ls. During that telephone conversation, Defendant
Reyns informed Mr. Charlesworth that the Partnership was "over." (Id. at 379-80; see,
e.g., id. at 423-24.)
Prior to that time, neither Defendant Reyns nor anyone else had ever indicated to
the Charlesworths in any manner, either outright or by implication, nor did the
Charlesworths otherwise know or suspect, or have reason to know or suspect, that she or
anyone else considered the Partnership "over," or that she was terminating, attempting to
terminate, or had terminated the Partnership or their interest in the Partnership. To the
contrary, she had indicated that the Plaintiffs were partners in the Partnership by sending
them Schedule K-ls that reflected their partnership status. (Id. at 380; see, e.g., id. at
424.)
Subsequently, in the summer of 1997, and only after Plaintiff Rennly
Charlesworth contacted a lawyer, the Charlesworths learned that Defendant Reyns had
sold the Property. The Charlesworths also learned that Defendant Reyns kept two-thirds
of the proceeds from this sale, and that she distributed the remaining one-third of the
proceeds from the sale to the Isom family. (Id. at 380; see e.g., id. at 424.)
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Prior to discovering that Defendant Reyns had sold the Property, neither she nor
anyone else had ever indicated to the Charlesworths in any manner, either outright or by
implication, nor did the Charlesworths otherwise know or suspect, nor have reason to
know or suspect, that the Property had been sold, that the owners of the Property had
changed in any manner, that Defendant Reyns or anyone else owned or claimed to own
the Property separate and apart from the Partnership, that Defendant Reyns had executed
and recorded deeds concerning the Property, or that she or anyone else claimed that the
Charlesworths no longer had an ownership interest in the Property. (Id. at 380; see, e.g.,
id. at 424.)
Among other things, in light of the fact that Defendant Reyns is the Plaintiffs'
aunt, in light of the fact that they therefore trusted her integrity implicitly, in light of the
explanations they received concerning the amount of the Partnership distributions, in
light of the fact that they had received annual distributions (either outright or as stated in
a Schedule K-l) for over two decades, and in light of the Schedule K-ls that they
received each year from Defendant Reyns that expressly recited their Partnership status
and their share of Partnership profits and losses, the Plaintiffs never knew or suspected,
nor did they have reason to know or suspect, that Defendant Reyns considered the
Partnership to be "over." For these same reasons, the Plaintiffs never suspected, nor did
they have reason to suspect, that Defendant Reyns had executed and recorded
conveyances concerning the Property, or that she had sold the Property and distributed
the proceeds of the sale. Similarly, in light of the fact that she apprised the Charlesworths
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of her efforts to sell the Property, the Charlesworths presumed she would apprise them if
in fact she found a buyer. {Id. at 381; see, e.g., id. at 425.)
Except as described below, none of the Charlesworths was ever shown, nor were
they privy to, any of the documents or deeds governing or related to the creation of the
Partnership, the purchase of the Property, or the Trust Agreement concerning the same.
In reviewing his father's papers in or around 1985 to 1988 after his father had passed
away, which was a very emotional time for him, Rennly Charlesworth came across an
apparent draft of what he now believes was the Partnership Agreement. It was on onion
skin paper and was almost illegible, and it was also unsigned. He therefore did not, and
could not for the most part, review its terms. {Id. at 381-82; see, e.g., id. at 425.)4
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
For almost thirty years, Reyns distributed the profits realized from renting the
apartments to her partners, including the Charlesworths. She distributed one-third of the
profits to herself, one-third to Isom, and the remaining one-third first to the
Charlesworths' parents on their behalf and later to the Charlesworths directly as they
attained their majority. Reyns also specifically acknowledged the partnership interests of
Isom and the Charlesworths by sending them partnership tax returns that expressly
reflected their status as general partners, and by making distributions of profits, either in

4

The Reynses asserted below that Rennly Charlesworth understood that he was to have
received an annual accounting concerning the Partnership's affairs. This claimed
understanding, however, was held by Mr. Charlesworth only at the time he was deposed
in this action. (R. at 344-45, 376, 438.)
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cash or as reflected in adjustments to the partners' capital accounts on the partnership tax
returns.
Nevertheless, and without notice to the Chariesworths, Reyns transferred their
interest in the Partnership to her family trust. Thereafter, Reyns made at least one cash
distribution and also continued to send federal tax forms to the Chariesworths on an
annual basis, which recited their status as partners, and made distributions or assessed
losses to them by virtue of adjustments to their capital accounts in the Partnership. In
addition, in response to inquiries from the Chariesworths concerning the small amount of
these distributions, the Reynses gave credible explanations about maintenance costs of
the aging apartments. These acts not only continued the Partnership, they concealed
Reynses actions. Therefore, at all times, the Reynses gave the appearance that the
Partnership, and the Chariesworths' interests therein, continued.
When Rennly Charlesworth failed to receive his Schedule K-l for the 1993 tax
year in 1994, he inquired of Reyns. At that time, in September of 1994, she informed
him that the partnership was "over." Later, in 1996, without notice to the Chariesworths,
the Reynses and Isoms sold the apartment complex outright to a third party, but have
refused to turn over one-third of the proceeds to the children. The Reynses provided onethird of the proceeds to Isom's heirs, but kept the remaining two-thirds for their family
trust.
The Reynses do not appeal the trial court's determination that the above acts
constitute breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and conversion, and warrant the
imposition of a constructive trust. They simply argue that the Chariesworths failed to
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seek an accounting prior to bringing this action, and that they filed the action outside the
applicable limitations periods. The Reynses do not otherwise contest the Charles worths'
entitlement to relief.
Although an accounting is generally required as a prerequisite to an intrapartnership action, that requirement is not absolute. As a practical matter, no accounting
is necessary here because the Partnership held one asset. Thus, it is a simple matter to
determine each partner's interest in the partnership. In addition, this Court has expressly
acknowledged that where a partner wrongfully dissolves a partnership and converts its
assets, the excluded partner may sue for specific performance and an accounting, or may
sue for damages. Thus, an accounting is not the only remedy allowed a partner.
As to the limitations periods, the Reynses' actions, as well as exceptional
circumstances, operated to toll them. The Reynses concealed the true state of affairs until
the fall of 1994. Only at that time were the Charleworths put on notice, inquiry or
otherwise, that Reyns was acting inconsistently with her duties to the Partnership. The
Charlesworths filed this action in June of 1997, which is within the limitations period of
all of the claims on which they prevailed on summary judgment. Accordingly, the trial
court correctly entered summary judgment for the Charlesworths. This Court should
affirm that decision.
ARGUMENT
The only issues before this Court are whether a partnership accounting is a
prerequisite to the Charlesworths' action, and whether the Charlesworths' claims are

21

barred by the applicable statutes of limitation. Under the facts of this case, and
applicable law, these technicalities do not bar the Charlesworths' claims.
I.

THE REYNSES DO NOT CONTEST LIABILITY FOR BREACH OF
CONTRACT, BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY, AND CONVERSION, OR
THE PROPRIETY OF A CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST, OTHER THAN TO
ARGUE THEIR DEFENSES OF AN ALLEGED ACCOUNTING
PREREQUISITE AND THE APPLICABLE STATUTES OF LIMITATION
The Reynses does not contest that Reyns, as a matter of law, owed contractual and

fiduciary duties to the Charlesworths as partners in the Partnership. Similarly, the
Reynses do not contest that Reyns, as a matter of law, breached those contractual and
fiduciary duties in failing to distribute to the Charlesworths their share of the profits
realized from the sale of the Property. They also do not contest that her actions constitute
conversion. The Reynses further do not contest that, as a matter of law, the
circumstances warrant imposition of a constructive trust. In sum, they do not challenge
the Charlesworths' substantive entitlement to relief in this action.
Instead, they claim that such relief is prohibited solely on the grounds that an
accounting is a prerequisite to an intra-partnership suit, and that the Charlesworths'
affirmative claims are barred by the applicable statutes of limitation. As demonstrated
below, neither is the case. Accordingly, the Court should affirm the trial court's decision.

22

II.

THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN CONCLUDING THAT AN
ACCOUNTING IS NOT A PREREQUISITE TO THIS ACTION AS A
MATTER OF LAW
A.

Well-Accepted Law Provides Exceptions to the General Rule
Requiring an Accounting as a Prerequisite to an Intra-Partnership Suit

The Reynses cite authority stating the general rule that a formal accounting is a
prerequisite to an intra-partnership action. (Appellees' Br. at 29-31.) However, the very
cases that the Reynses cite for this proposition acknowledge that an accounting is not
always a prerequisite to a suit between partners. For example, Durham v. Southwest
Developers, 996 P.2d 911 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999), observes that the rationale for the
general rule is a practical one. In many partnerships, it is impossible to determine a
partner's interest until there is a full settling of partnership accounts. Id. at 918-19. For
example, another case cited by the Reynses held that an accounting was a prerequisite to
suit between partners where the partnership involved a "multitude of transactions" and a
"complexity of accounts." Cornell & Co. v. Pace, 703 S.W.2d 398,403 (Tex. Ct. App.
1986).
In yet another case cited by the Reynses, this Court expressly acknowledged that
where a partner wrongfully dissolves a partnership and converts its assets, as here, the
excluded partner may sue for specific performance and an accounting, or may sue for
damages. Wanlass v. D Land Title, 790 P.2d 568, 572 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (citing
Jeaness v. Besnilian, 706 P.2d 143 (Nev. 1985)).
Reported cases throughout the country are in accord. For example, in Battles v.
LaSalle National Bank, 608 N.E.2d 438 (111. Ct. App. 1992), the court considered

23

"whether a partner may sue another partner without requesting a final accounting where
the damages sought were for breach of fiduciary duty in disposing of partnership [real]
property." Id. at 440. The court noted the general rule prohibiting suits between partners
in the absence of an accounting. It observed, however, that there are "numerous
exceptions to the rule that [make] the rule inapplicable." Id. at 444 (emphasis added).
The rationale underlying the rule is that the resolution of disputes between partners
often requires an accounting to determine whether the partner claiming an amount from a
co-partner is not himself liable to the co-partner in connection with partnership debts. Id.
Thus, where a suit may be resolved short of a full review of the partnership's accounts, an
accounting is unnecessary. Id. Additionally, an accounting is not necessary "when the
joint property has been wrongfully destroyed or converted or when one partner has been
guilty of fraud that results in defeating the rights of the complaining party." Id.
Courts around the nation have similarly held that there are exceptions to the
general accounting-first rule in a variety of contexts, including where the partnership was
limited to a single venture and there are no complex accounting issues, or where the
defendant partner breached fiduciary duties or improperly used partnership assets. See,
e.g., Sertich v. Moorman, 783 P.2d 1199, 1205 (Ariz. 1989) (en banc) (stating that case
illustrates that continued enforcement of the accounting-first rule "is indeed illogical,
impractical, and inequitable" and holding that the "general accounting requirement as a
condition precedent to an action at law between partners or a partner and the partnership
is abolished"); Laughlin v. Haberfelde, 165 P.2d 544, 548 (Cal. 1946) (accounting is not
a prerequisite where acts of defendant partner constitute a tort, especially where such
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wrongful acts destroy the partnership and where the erring partner converts partnership
assets to his own use); Schreibman v. Zanetti, 909 S.W.2d 692, 699 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995)
(accounting not necessary in case involving breach of contract, breach of partnership,
conversion, and fraud, even where statute requires accounting upon dissolution, where
defendant partners denied existence of partnership); Hanes v. Giambrone, 471 N.E.2d
801, 807 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984) (observing that "many courts" have held that an action at
law may be maintained by one partner against another when no complex accounting
involving a variety of partnership transactions is necessary); Mandrell v. McBee, 892
S.W.2d 842, 847 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995) (exceptions to general accounting-first rule
"when the lawsuit arises out of the breach of a partner's fiduciary obligations to the
partnership, fraud, or the improper use of partnership funds").
Thus, as acknowledged by the Reynses' own authorities, by this Court, and by
jurisdictions throughout the country, an accounting is not a prerequisite to an intrapartnership action where the partnership at issue was simple in nature with simple
accounts, or where the defendant has wrongfully repudiated the partnership and
converted its assets. Both are the case in the instant matter.
B.

An Accounting Is Unnecessary Here as a Practical Matter
1.

An Accounting Is Unnecessary in Light of the Facts of This Case

The Partnership had one asset: the Charlesworth Court apartments. (Appellees'
Br. at 25 (describing apartments as "sole asset of the partnership").) The Partnership
accounts were simple and consisted merely of incoming rent and maintenance and related
costs. The capital accounts were settled each year in Schedule K-ls, which were
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prepared by Reyns's own accountant and reflected each year's profit and losses.
Moreoever, the Reynses have not asserted any claim of offset against the Charlesworths'
claims, nor have they asserted any counterclaim in which they allege that they are entitled
to any sums from the Charlesworths. (R. at 137-46.) Thus, in light of the above
authorities, a formal accounting is not necessary to resolve the interests of the Partners.
This case simply boils down to whether Plaintiffs are entitled to a one-third share
of the proceeds realized from the sale of the Property. There is no dispute as to the
amount for which the Property was sold, and the Reynses do not claim any setoffs or
counterclaims. Thus, no accounting is necessary to resolve the matter. An accounting
would be wasteful in this instance, which is why the exceptions to the general rule exist.
2.

An Action for Formal Accounting Was Timely Asserted and
Would Have Produced the Same Result as Reached by the Trial
Court

Because, as explained below, the Partnership did not dissolve and/or a claim for an
accounting did not accrue until 1994 when Reyns told the Charlesworths the Partnership
was "over," the Charlesworths timely asserted a claim for an accounting. Even applying
the shortest of the potentially applicable limitations periods to that claim, which the
Reynses concede is four years, (Appellees' Br. at 32-33), the Charlesworths properly
filed their claim in 1997. Moreover, an accounting would have produced the same result

5

The Reynses claim for the first time on this appeal that they were not credited with
certain closing costs in the Judgment entered by the trial court, the form and entry of
which they did not contest. This argument is addressed infra at Section IV. Even if the
Court considers the Reynses' argument in this regard, it represents a simple, arithmetic
deduction.
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as reached by the trial court. The Charlesworths dismissed their claim for an accounting
only after the trial court ruled that they had a one-third interest in the partnership and its
proceeds. Given that the Property was the sole asset of the Partnership, and there were no
other outstanding claims concerning partnership distributions, a formal accounting would
have yielded the same result - the Charlesworths were entitled to a one-third interest in
the Partnership and its proceeds. An accounting was thus unnecessary.
The Reynses submit that the Charlesworths filed their claim for an accounting
outside the limitations period, which the Reynses claim began variously in 1983, 1985, or
1988. Specifically, the Reynses argue that the Partnership dissolved and/or that a claim
for an accounting accrued in 1983 because the Partnership allegedly terminated by its
terms upon completion of the payments required under the Contract, because the Trust
Agreement terminated by its terms (which eliminated the partnership interest of those
claiming through the trust), or because Reyns conveyed a two-thirds interest in the
Property to herself, half of which was the Charlesworths' under the Partnership
Agreement. The Reynses argue that the Partnership dissolved and/or a claim for an
accounting accrued in 1985 because Reyns transferred the Charlesworths' interest to the
Reyns Family Trust or because it allegedly was the last year the Charlesworths received a
distribution. The Reynses argue that the Partnership also dissolved and/or a claim for an
accounting accrued in 1988 when Isom passed away. (Appellees' Br. at 32.)
None of these contentions is correct. The Partnership Agreement specifically
stated that it may be modified by agreement of the parties. After the Contract was paid
off in 1983, Reyns continued to run the Partnership. She continued to treat Isom and the
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Charlesworths as partners. She paid them profits received from the partnership and sent
the partners Schedule K-ls for twenty more years. Until Reyns sold the Property in
1996, she made absolutely no effort to wind up the Partnership's affairs. To the contrary,
Reyns affirmed and continued the Partnership by taking out a loan to repair the property
payable over four years, which was one of several acts inconsistent with dissolved status.
Thus, payment of the Contract did not work a dissolution. Similarly, the Trust
Agreement expressly stated that, if the beneficiaries are twenty-one or more when the
Contract is paid off, each beneficiary's "share of the trust principal as an undivided
interest" "shall be transferred to him." Thus, the terms of the trust automatically vested a
Partnership interest in the Charlesworths. Also, the fact that Reyns recorded the twothirds interest in her name did not work a dissolution. First, Partnership property may be
held in the name of one or more of the individual partners. Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-7.
Second, the Charlesworths were completely unaware of this fact. As a case cited by the
Reynses acknowledges, the limitations period for a cause of action for an accounting does
not begin to run until the party in whom the cause of action vests becomes aware of the
events giving rise to the cause of action. Durham, 996 P.2d at 919 (statute of limitations
on accounting action did not run against party unaware of event giving rise to
dissolution). Thus, the mere fact that the Property was held in the name of only some of
the partners did not work a dissolution and/or did not trigger a claim for an accounting.
Therefore, none of the events occurring in 1983 worked a dissolution or triggered an
action for an accounting.
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Reyns's transfer of the Charlesworths' interest in the Property to the Reyns Family
Trust in 1985 similarly did not trigger an action for an accounting. The Charlesworths
had no notice that Reyns had made this transfer. The Reynses also claim that no
Partnership distributions were made after 1985. This is contrary to the undisputed record.
Not only did Reyns make one or two cash distributions after that date, but she also made
distributions for almost a decade thereafter by distributing profits and losses by making
adjustments to the Charlesworths' capital accounts. Therefore, the events occurring in
1985 did not trigger an action for an accounting either.
Finally, the Reynses argue that Isom's death in 1988 worked a dissolution of the
Partnership. However, the Utah Uniform Partnership Act contemplates the continuation
of a partnership after the death of a partner. It specifically provides for the rights of the
estate of a deceased partner when the business is continued after the death of the partner.
Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-39. The Wanlass decision of this Court, which the Reynses cite,
similarly recognizes that, upon agreement of the parties, a partnership may continue after
an event that would normally result in dissolution. 790 P.2d at 570-71 (citing Utah Code
Ann. §§ 48-1-34, -39, -40). In its analysis, the Court observed that, at the time of
dissolution occasioned by the death of a partner, the deceased partner's estate is entitled
to the deceased partner's share "or a share in the continued partnership." Id. at 571.
As permitted by statute, and acknowledged in Wanlass, the Partnership in this case
continued after Isom's death. The Partnership conducted business as usual after her
death, without any winding up or settlement of accounts between the partners. Reyns
continued to operate the apartments and collect rent. Reyns continued to send the
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partners Schedule K-ls expressly acknowledging that she, Isom's heirs, and the
Charlesworths were partners in the Partnership, and reflecting distributions in the form of
adjustments to their respective capital accounts. The Property was still maintained and
being rented just as it was before Isom's death. Reyns and her husband also sent letters
to the Charlesworths describing the maintenance of the apartments and the reasons why
the Partnership distributions were so small. Importantly, one of these letters indicated
that the Partnership had taken out a new loan that would be payable over a four year
period. These undisputed facts demonstrate that the Partnership continued after Isom's
death. As permitted in the Uniform Partnership Act, Isom's heirs accepted a share in the
continued partnership. Wanlass, 790 P.2d at 571. Moreover, after Isom's death, the
Partnership became obligated to repay a loan concerning the Property. The fact that the
Partnership took on this new obligation after Isom's death without doubt shows that the
Partnership continued. Accordingly, the events of 1988 did not trigger a cause of action
for an accounting.
Because no action for an accounting was triggered until 1994, the Charlesworths
timely filed their claim for an accounting. When that claim became superfluous, the
Charlesworths dismissed it so as to minimize costs to the parties and the Court, and assist
in obtaining a resolution of the matter. Given that the Property constituted the sole asset
of the Partnership, and that the Reynses had not asserted or suggested that any sums
should be deducted from the Charlesworths' one-third share of the proceeds of the
Property, the accounting claim was unnecessary.
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C\

An Accounting Is Also Unnecessary Here Because Reyns Wrongfully
Dissolved the Partnership

Further, the Reynses have not contested that Reyns breached the Partnership
Agreement, breached her fiduciary duties, and converted Partnership property. As
indicated above, in such instances an accounting is not required. This Court has ruled
that, where a partnership is wrongfully dissolved, an accounting is unnecessary. See, e.g.,
Wanlass, 790 P.2d at 572 (aggrieved party may forego accounting remedy in case of
wrongful repudiation of partnership and sue for damages).
The Reynses argue that a party must first seek an accounting before the party may
object to the distribution of partnership assets, even where those assets have been
converted. They cite Wanlass as authority for this proposition. (Appellees' Br. at 28-29.)
In doing so, however, they ignore the context of the Wanlass decision. It is correct, as
the Reynses observe, that this Court held that the aggrieved party in Wanlass must obtain
an accounting before pursuing other remedies. 790 P.2d at 572. However, the Court
specifically observed that its holding was based on the fact that the partnership at issue
had not been wrongfully dissolved. Instead, it was dissolved by operation of law upon
the death of a partner. Id. Upon the death of the partner, the remaining partner and the
deceased partner's heirs were unable to agree to either continue the business or to sell it.
Id. at 570. The Court stated that, had one of the partners wrongfully repudiated the
partnership and converted its assets,
"the excluded partner . . . may waive the tort or breach and sue to specifically
enforce the partnership or joint venture agreement, including the remedy of a
judicial dissolution and an accounting . . . or the victim may submit to the
repudiation and sue for damages for breach of the joint venture agreement."
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Id. (quoting Jeaness v. Besnilian, 706 P.2d 143, 145-46 (Nev. 1985) (internal quotations
omitted)).6
Here, if the Reynses are at all correct that the Partnership dissolved prior to 1994,
it could only have dissolved when Reyns transferred the Charlesworths' one-third interest
in the Property to the Reyns Family Trust. At that time, arguably, the Property was no
longer titled in the name of a partner, and therefore the transfer may have worked a
dissolution. If so, the dissolution was wrongful because, as the trial court ruled and the
Reynses do not appeal, the Property was in fact property of the Partnership. Transferring
the Property to a third-party (here, the Reynses as trustees of their family trust) without
the consent of the Charlesworths, is not permitted by the Partnership Agreement or by the
Utah Uniform Partnership Act. Such a transfer would work a wrongful dissolution.
Thus, under Wanlass, Reyns's transfer of the Charlesworths' interest in the Property gave
the Charlesworths the option to sue to seek an accounting or to seek damages. As
discussed below, although the Charlesworths' claims may have accrued as early as this
time, the trial court was correct in ruling that the limitations period governing those
claims was tolled until 1994.7

6

The Reynses are similarly incorrect in their citation of Cheves v. Williams, 1999 UT 86,
993 P.2d 191, for the proposition that an accounting is the only remedy among copartners. (Appellees' Br. at 28 n.3 (citing Cheves, 1999 UT 86, U 34).) Appellees
merely cite to the argument of counsel recited by the Court in Cheves, not to a holding
of the Court.

7

Appellees make a policy argument to the effect that the Charlesworths accounting claim
was not timely asserted because the Reynses disposed of Partnership books and records
in 1996 (curiously, this was after the wrongful sale of the apartments to the third-party).
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III.

THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN CONCLUDING THAT THE
APPLICABLE STATUTES OF LIMITATION DO NOT BAR THE
CHARLESWORTHS' CLAIMS
The Reynses acknowledge that the shortest statute of limitation governing the

Charlesworths' claims in this matter is three years. (Appellees' Br. at 24-25) The
Charlesworths undisputedly filed this action within three years of the date Reyns
informed them that the Partnership was "over" in the fall of 1994. The limitations
periods were tolled until that time. Until then, the Charlesworths did not know, nor
should they have known, nor did they have constructive or inquiry notice, of Reyns's
wrongdoing. Because the Charlesworths filed their claims within three years of that date,
their claims are not time barred.
Generally, a cause of action accrues and the relevant statute of limitations begins
to run on the happening of the last event necessary to complete the cause of action.
Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45, 50 (Utah 1996). However, in certain circumstances,
the discovery rule operates to toll the limitations period until a party discovers the facts
forming the basis of the cause of action. Id. 50-51. The discovery rule applies: (1) when

This argument is unavailing for several reasons. First, as indicated above, an
accounting is not necessary under the circumstances of this case. Second, the Reynses
have failed to state what, if anything, they are unable to prove without these records.
Third, the Reynses have not asserted any claims for offset or counterclaims in this
action, and thus any such records are irrelevant.
Appellees also claim that the Pelland decision supports their claim that the
Charlesworths' time to seek an accounting was not tolled. (Appellees' Br. at 33-39.)
Appellees ignore, however, that the Court in Pelland observed that the plaintiff was
aware of the transfer of property when it occurred. Michael v. Pelland, No. 229876,
2002 WL 31105082, *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 20, 2002). A copy of the Pelland decision
is submitted in the attached Addendum at Tab C.
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mandated by statute; (2) when a defendant has concealed a plaintiffs cause of action; or
(3) when exceptional circumstances exist. Any one of these three is sufficient to trigger
application of the discovery rule to toll the statute of limitations. Id. at 51. In this case,
the second and third versions of the discovery rule mandate that the Charles worths'
claims did not accrue until Reyns told them that the Partnership was "over." The
Charlesworths filed the instant suit within three years of that time, which the Reynses
concede is the shortest period of limitations that applies to the Charlesworths' claims.
Thus, their claims are not barred by the statute of limitations.
A.

The Discovery Rule Tolled the Applicable Limitations Periods Because
the Reynses Concealed the Charlesworths' Causes of Action

The discovery rule applies when a defendant conceals a plaintiffs cause of action
in order to prevent the defendant from profiting from such concealment. Id. at 52. For
the discovery rule to apply on the ground that a defendant concealed the cause of action
from the plaintiff, the plaintiff must make a prima facie showing of fraudulent
concealment and demonstrate that a reasonable person would not have discovered the
claim earlier. Id. at 51. This requires a determination of "(i) when a plaintiff would
reasonably be on notice to inquire into a defendant's wrongdoing despite the defendant's
efforts to conceal it; and (ii) whether a plaintiff, once on notice, would reasonably have,
with due diligence, discovered the facts forming the basis of the cause of action despite
the defendant' efforts to conceal those facts." Id. at 52.
The facts of this case warrant application of the fraudulent concealment version of
the discovery rule. The Reynses clearly attempted to conceal the facts giving rise to the
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Charlesworths' claims herein. As previously stated in this memorandum, Reyns overtly
treated the Charlesworths as partners until 1994. Prior to that time, Reyns had made
partnership distributions to them, sent them K-ls reciting their partnership status and
reflecting their share of Partnership distributions and losses, and Reyns's husband had
sent letters to them explaining why the Partnership distributions had been small. During
that time, however, and unbeknownst to the Charlesworths, Reyns had transferred the
Charlesworths' share of the Property into her own family trust and had even obtained a
quitclaim deed meant for Shirlie Charlesworth, of which Shirlie was unaware, and failed
to deliver it to her. By failing to inform the Charlesworths of her actions, as was her
fiduciary duty, and instead pretending as if the Partnership continued, Reyns, assisted by
her husband, concealed her wrongdoing.
Given the Reynses' concealment, a reasonable person would not have discovered
the true state of affairs any earlier than the Charlesworths did. Importantly, the Reynses'
efforts to conceal their wrongdoing occurred after Reyns clandestinely transferred the
two-thirds interest in the Property to her family trust. Thus, the Charlesworths had no
reason to suspect Reyns's transfer. The Reynses claim that the Charlesworths stopped
receiving partnership distributions after 1985, and that this fact allegedly put the
Charlesworths on inquiry notice of the Reynses' wrongdoing. As noted above, however,
this statement flies in the face of the facts of this case.
The Reynses also contend that the Charlesworths were put on inquiry notice when
they purportedly demanded an accounting and were rebuffed. Contrary to the Reynses'
assertions, however, the Charlesworths did not request an accounting, nor were they
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rebuffed. Instead, in 1988, they made a simple inquiry as to why the cash distributions
had ceased. Importantly, in response, the Reynses did not divulge that Reyns had
transferred the Charlesworths' interest in the Property to her family trust three years
earlier. Instead, Reyns's husband responded with a letter stating that the distributions
were small in light of a number of factors, including significant maintenance costs,
increased property taxes, and lower rents as a result of competition from federal lowincome housing being built in the area. The explanation seemed reasonable to the
Charlesworths, as it would to anyone, and they did not inquire into the matter further.
Again, such events did not put Plaintiffs on inquiry notice.
The Reynses finally contend that the Charlesworths were on inquiry notice
because the Schedule K-ls showed distributions to the Charlesworths that had not been
made. On the contrary, the distributions were made into the Charlesworths' capital
accounts, which were reflected in the K-ls themselves. Through adjustments in their
capital accounts, the Charlesworths continued to share in the profits and losses of the
Partnership while the Reynses secretly transferred the Charlesworths' share of the
Property into their family trust.
Based on these facts, no reasonable person would have suspected that a cause of
action had accrued to them. The Charlesworths had even less reason to suspect
wrongdoing because Reyns was a family member. Moreover, she had fiduciary duties to
the Charlesworths, who were her fellow partners. They had a right to trust her continued
representations that the Charlesworths were partners and her continued treatment of them
as such. See, e.g., Given v. Cappas, 486 N.E.2d 583, 593 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (a
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partner's fiduciary duty to disclose self-dealing "excus[es] his partners of any duty of
diligence in discovering the true state of affairs"); First Bank & Trust of Idaho v. Jones,
725 P.2d 186, 189 (Idaho Ct. App. 1986) (given the nature of a partner's fiduciary duty to
other partners, "if an undisclosed breach [of that duty] exists the statute of limitations was
tolled until the breach was unequivocally made known to [the non-breaching partner]").
In Weaver v. Watson, 474 N.E.2d 759 (111. Ct. App. 1984), the Illinois Court of
Appeals decided a matter that bears similarity to the instant case. In Weaver, one of two
partners in a partnership died in 1974. Mrs. Weaver, the wife of the deceased partner,
eventually filed a complaint for an accounting against the surviving partner in 1981. In
her suit, Mrs. Weaver alleged that she took over her husband's interest in the partnership
after he died. Id. at 761-63. The surviving partner alleged that the statute of limitations
began to run upon the death of Mrs. Weaver's husband in 1974, and thus the statute of
limitations for an accounting had expired. Id. Mrs. Weaver argued that the statute did
not begin to run until she discovered that the surviving partner had dropped her name
from the partnership checking account. Id. The court noted that the result was no
different under either scenario. Id. at 763. The court observed that the surviving partner
was the dominant figure in the partnership. Id. Also, the surviving partner sent Mrs.
Weaver checks marked "dividend," which the court believed amounted to a
representation by the surviving partner that Mrs. Weaver had an interest in the
partnership and that the interest would be recognized. Id. In light of those
circumstances, the court held that "the statute of limitations was tolled until Mrs. Weaver
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learned of [the surviving partner's] actions inconsistent with her claimed interest in the
partnership business." Id.
Because the Reynses concealed the facts giving rise to the Charlesworths' causes
of action by, among other things, representing to them that they had a partnership
interest, and because they did not know and had no reason to know of the facts giving rise
to their claims, the fraudulent concealment version of the discovery rule operated to toll
the statutes of limitation on their claims until Reyns told them that the Partnership was
"over." Under the facts presented herein, no one would have had reason to suspect the
Reynses' actions prior to that time.
B.

The Discovery Rule Applies in Light of Exceptional Circumstances

The Court may also apply the discovery rule where exceptional circumstances
would make application of the general rule as to the accrual of a limitations period
irrational or unjust. The test to determine whether exceptional circumstances warrant
application of the discovery rule is a balancing test. The test weighs the hardship
imposed on the plaintiff by the application of the statute of limitations against any
prejudice to the defendant from the passage of time. Snow v. Rudd, 998 P.2d 262, 266
(Utah 2000); Sevy v. Security Title Co., 902 P.2d 629, 636 (Utah 1995). As the Utah
Supreme Court noted in Rudd, "[i]n the category of cases involving beneficiaries' claims
of trustee misconduct, we have, in effect, already conducted this balancing test." Rudd,
998 P.2d at 266. In that context, to not apply the discovery rule would be unjust,
particularly where familial relationships are involved. Id. "In such a situation, the
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beneficiary will be less likely to question the motives of the trustee and less likely to
sue." Id, Therefore, it is appropriate to apply the discovery rule in that setting.
A partner has a duty to hold any profits derived from use of partnership property
as a trustee for any other partners in the partnership. Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-8; MandrelL
892 S.W.2d at 845. This duty arises out of the fiduciary relationship that exists between
partners, which requires a partner to act with the highest standard of integrity and good
faith. Giambrone, 471 N.E.2d at 808. Because the duty of a partner to other partners in
the partnership is the same as that of a trustee to a beneficiary, the Rudd decision suggests
that a breach of that duty is an exceptional circumstance sufficient to trigger application
of the discovery rule. That is particularly so where the parties at issue are family
members.
The Reynses should not be allowed to keep the fruits of their wrongdoing under
the circumstances of this case. To allow them to keep their ill-gotten gain would create
poor public policy and encourage fraud. Given the Reynses' relationship to the
Charles worths, the Reynses' efforts to conceal their wrongdoing, and the Charles worths'
ignorance of the Reynses' actions, the Charlesworths did not know of, nor did they have
reason to suspect, the Reynses' wrongdoing until Reyns finally disclosed that she
Q

believed the Partnership was "over."

8

In Rudd, the Court determined that, notwithstanding application of the discovery rule as
a result of exceptional circumstances, plaintiffs claims were barred by the applicable
statute of limitations because she had reason to know of facts giving rise to her claim
more than four years (the applicable limitations period) before she filed suit. Unlike this
case, the plaintiff in Rudd was confused about the nature of the trust, and she was also
aware that the property in which she claimed an interest was sold out of the trust. 998
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In light of the above showing, the discovery rule applied to the Charles worths'
claims. Thus, they must only have filed this action within the applicable limitations
period from the time they knew or should have known of the facts giving rise to their
causes of action. Because the Charlesworths did not know or have reason to know of the
Reynses' defalcations until Reyns told them the Partnership was "over," and they filed
their claims within the shortest of the applicable limitations periods from that time, their
claims are not time-barred.9
C.

The Charlesworths Did Not Have Constructive Notice of the Reynses'
Actions by Virtue of Their Recording the Deeds Transferring the
Property with the County Recorder

The Reynses argue that the Charlesworths are charged with constructive notice of
the Reynses' actions with respect to the Property because Reyns's transfer of the Property
to her family trust was the subject of a deed recorded with the Weber County Recorder.
The Reynses posit that recording a deed provides notice to all persons of the contents of
the deed. In making this assertion, the Reynses appear to suggest that the Charlesworths

P.2d at 266-67. Here, none of the Charlesworths, or Shirlie Charlesworth, were ever
given copies of the governing documents. Plaintiff Rennly Charlesworth may have
received an unsigned copy of the Partnership agreement, but it was virtually illegible and
he did not and could not review its terms. Also, there was no confusion about the
Partnership in their minds—Reyns's performance seemed steady and sensible. Finally,
unlike the plaintiff in Rudd, they were completely unaware that Reyns had transferred
their portion of the Property to her family trust.
9

The Charlesworths believe that the record before the Court warrants denial of the
Reynses' cross motion as a matter of law. To the extent that the Court believes there is
conflicting evidence as to when the facts giving rise to the Charlesworths' claims were or
should have been discovered, the Court should similarly not enter judgment in the
Reynses' favor and allow the jury to decide such issues. Berenda, 914 P.2d at 53-54, 902
P.2d at 634.
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had a duty to periodically search the records of the Weber County Recorder to check up
on their aunt, who was not only a family member, but also owed fiduciary duties to them.
Not only is this result in itself impractical, but it is contrary to the requirements of Utah
law.
The Utah Supreme Court has clarified that recording statutes "'are intended to
protect those having subsequent dealings with the property'" and "'impute[] notice only
to those who are bound to search for it.'" Aurora Credit Servs., Inc. v. Liberty West Dev.,
970 P.2d 1273, 1279 (Utah 1998) (quoting Romero v. Sanchez, 492 P.2d 140, 144 (N.M.
1971)). The constructive notice afforded by the recording statute is not notice to the
public at large. It is the transferee of the property that is bound to search for
encumbrances thereof and who is deemed to have constructive knowledge of such
encumbrances. The very case cited by the Reynses, Johnson v. Higley, 989 P.2d 61
(Utah Ct. App. 1999), makes this point. See id. at 70 ("The recording statute's purpose is
to provide a method by which a transferee can protect himself from intervening
claimants." (quotation omitted)); see also First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. J.B. Ranch, Inc., 966
P.2d 834, 839 (Utah 1998) ("The salutariness of the recording statute is that it provides
stability and certainty to land titles on which purchasers must rely."). Indeed, as the
Romero court observed in rejecting the notion advanced by the Reynses, the recording
statutes cannot be construed to give notice to the world at large. 492 P.2d at 143-44.
Otherwise, such statutes would serve as an automatic shelter for fraud. Id.
The Charleworths were not a transferee of the Property - Reyns's family trust was
the transferee. Moreover, the Reynses do not, and cannot, cite to any authority creating a
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duty in the Charlesworths to search for the instrument Reyns used to transfer the Property
to her family trust under the circumstances of this case. As a practical matter, it stretches
credulity to suggest that the Charlesworths should have visited the county recorder's
office as a matter of course every few months to inquire as to the status of the Property.
It stretches credulity even further when the Charlesworths were not only dealing with a
fellow partner who owes them the highest level of fiduciary duty, but their own aunt.
The fact that Reyns recorded the instrument transferring the Property to her family trust
cannot be held to have imparted constructive notice of her activities to the Charlesworths.
See Rappleye v. Rappleye, 2004 UT App. 290,1fi[ 32-33, 507 Utah Adv. Rep. 39
(concealment prong of discovery rule applies to toll statute of limitations regardless of
inquiry or constructive notice).
D,

The Reynses' Cases Are Inapposite

The Reynses rely on four cases to argue that the discovery rule does not apply in
this case. However, each is distinguishable from the instant facts. First, in Anderson v.
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 920 P.2d 575 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), the plaintiff was aware
that the primary asset of the trust in which she was the beneficiary (consisting of over $1
million in stock in Levi Strauss) was completely lost, while the unemployed trustee (her
son) bought a $500,000 home and Mercedes and BMW automobiles. Id. at 576-77, 579.
The trust was her nest egg, and she believed that the funds in the trust were
"untouchable." Id. at 579. Under these circumstances, the Court held that the plaintiff
was on inquiry notice, which precluded application of the discovery rule. Accordingly,
the Court upheld dismissal of her claim. Id. at 580. In this action, the plaintiffs timely
42

filed suit after they were told the partnership was over in 1994 and once they discovered
that Reyns sold their interest in the Property. Until that time, it is undisputed that they
were unaware that the primary asset of the Partnership had been liquidated.
Second, in Nilson-Newey & Co. v. Utah Resources International, 905 P.2d 312
(Utah Ct. App. 1995), the Court affirmed the dismissal of a case based on laches and the
statute of limitations where a member of a syndicate was not provided an accounting for
thirty-five years, where he had not received any distributions for twenty years, and where
he had never been provided with form 10-Ks. Id. at 313, 317. In addition to delaying to
seek an accounting for decades, the Court found that the defendant would be prejudiced if
the matter went forward because, among other things, the syndicate engaged in
"numerous, complex transactions with numerous, unrelated individuals and entities
involving millions of dollars over a period of thirty-five years" and many of the
documents and witnesses concerning the transaction are unavailable. Id. at 316, 317.
The instant case presents an opposite set of facts. As demonstrated above, the
Charlesworths received distributions until 1994, the year in which they did not receive a
Schedule K-l, after receiving them regularly for years and years. Moreover, in contrast
to the syndicate in Nilson-Newey, the Partnership was very simple, and comprised of one
asset. Moreover, throught the Schedule K-ls, the Partnership accounts were settled each
year. Thus, Nilson-Newey is inapposite.
Third, the Reynses cite Leggroan v. Zion 's Savings Bank & Trust Co., 232 P.2d
746 (Utah 1951). Again, this case does not support their position. In Leggroan, a trust
terminated and was liquidated over a period often years. Over time, the distributions
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became smaller and less frequent. Id. at 750. Importantly, the Utah Supreme Court
observed that "each successive payment would halt the running of the reasonable time
period" for the beneficiaries to realize that the last distribution had been made and for the
limitations period to run and laches begin to accrue. Id. The Court ultimately held that to
have waited three or four years after the last known payment was unreasonable. Id.
Moreover, the defendant had been prejudiced by the passage of time in that documents
and witnesses were unavailable, which precluded obtaining a reliable set of facts. Id.
Once again, the instant facts distinguish this case. Here, although the payments became
smaller, distributions were made each and every year until Reyns said, in response to an
inquiry from the Charlesworths, that the Partnership was over. Moreover, unlike in
Leggroan, the Partnership had not terminated. Further, there is no prejudice to the
Reynses. All of the documents and witnesses necessary are available. The basic contract
documents were submitted of record, as were the documents effecting the transfers of
property. The Reynses have failed to show that any missing documents are necessary to
the disposition of this action. Accordingly, the Reynses reliance on Leggroan is
misplaced.
Finally, the Reynses rely on Baldwin v. Burton, 850 P.2d 1188 (Utah 1993) That
case is also distinguishable from the facts of record in this matter. In Baldwin, the Utah
Supreme Court held that a judgment creditor's claim was time barred. Id. at 1197. The
Court observed that after obtaining a judgment lien, the judgment creditor should have
searched for the property at issue. Id. Obviously, there was no judgment against the
Reynses until this year. Thus, the rule in Baldwin does not apply.
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Not only do the cases cited by the Reynses fail to support their position, but they
in fact highlight the applicability and propriety of the discovery rule in this case. Until
Reyns told them the Partnership was "over," the Charlesworths had no suspicion, nor
reason to be suspicious, nor any actual knowledge of Reyns's actions. In light of their
continued annual distributions, and the Reynses' explanations, the Charlesworths acted
reasonably. Moreover, there is no prejudice to the Reynses because of the elementary
nature of the Partnership, the fact that it had a sole asset, the fact that its accounts were
settled each year, and the fact that the relevant documents are of record. Accordingly, the
Court should affirm the trial court's decision that the discovery rule tolled the applicable
statutes of limitation until 2004.
E.

In Any Event, Reyns Extended the Statutory Period for the
Charlesworths' Breach of Contract Claim by Reaffirming Her
Obligations to Them

The Utah Code expressly provides that "[i]n any case founded on contract," the
limitations period begins to run anew when the defendant, or defendant's agent, pays a
portion of principal or interest due; acknowledges an existing liability, debt, or claim; or
promises to pay such liability, claim, or debt, if such acknowledgement or promise is
made in writing signed by the party to be charged. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-44; Butcher
v. Gilroy, 744 P.2d 311,313 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Apart from their arguments
concerning an accounting and the statutes of limitation, the Reynses have not contested
that they owed a contractual duty to the Charlesworths by virtue of the Partnership
Agreement. Reyns breached this duty by failing to pay Plaintiffs their portion of the
proceeds from the sale of the Property. Until 1993, Reyns or her agent annually sent the
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Charlesworths Schedule K-ls in which she reaffirmed that they were partners in the
Partnership, and paid distributions to or deducted losses from their capital accounts.
Through this annual acknowledgement of the Charlesworths' interest in the
Partnership, she reaffirmed her obligations to them. Thus, under this statute, the
Charlesworths are only required to have filed their claim within the limitations period
from the latest date on which Reyns acknowledged their interest and/or made payments
to them. Accordingly, the limitations period on the Charlesworths' breach of contract
claim began to run no earlier than 1993, which was the last time Reyns acknowledged
their interest and made a distribution to them. It is undisputed that the Charlesworths
filed their claim within six years of that date - the limitations period governing breach of
written contract claims. Therefore, regardless of the disposition of the Charlesworths'
other claims in this action, the Court should affirm the trial court's decision on the
Charlesworths' breach of contract claim.
IV.

THE REYNSES DO NOT PROPERLY CONTEST THE JUDGMENT
AMOUNT
The Reynses suggest in their opening brief that the Judgment entered by the trial

court failed to give them credit for alleged closing costs paid on the sale of the
apartments. (Appellees' Br. at 21-22, 31.) However, the Reynses have not properly
raised this issue for at least three independent reasons. As a result, the Court should
disregard the Reynses' assertion in this regard.
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A.

The Amount the Reynses Received from the Sale of the Apartments,
Which Formed the Basis of the Judgment Amount, Was Admitted
Below

First, the Reynses failed to contest the amount of consideration that the
Charlesworths maintained was received by the Reyns Family Trust and Ellen Isom as a
result of the sale, which amount was used as the basis of the Judgment amount. In the
statement of fact supporting the Charlesworths' motion for summary judgment, the
Charlesworths alleged that, of the $350,000 paid by the purchasers of the property, the
Reyns Family Trust received two-thirds of this amount and Ellen Isom's heirs received
one-third of this amount. (R. at 197, 273, 280-81, 325.) The Reyns's failed to contest
this statement of fact. {Id. at 339, 343, 372.) As a result, it is deemed admitted, and
cannot now be challenged. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e); see also Utah Code of Judicial
Admin. R. 4-501(2)(B), repealed November 1, 2003 (effective at the time of the trial
court's order granting summary judgment and providing that "[a]ll material facts set forth
in the movant's statement and properly supported by accurate reference to the record
shall be deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless specifically
controverted by the opposing party's statement."); Gary Porter Constr. v. Fox Constr.,
Inc., 2004 UT App

,ffl[13-15, WL 2248195 (applying Utah Code of Judicial Admin.

R. 4-501(2)(B) where rule was in effect at time summary judgment papers were filed).10

A copy of the Porter decision is submitted in the attached Addendum at Tab D.
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B.

The Reynses Failed to Take Issue with the Judgment Amount Below,
and Therefore Waived Any Argument in This Regard

Second, the Reynses did not raise this issue in response to the Charles worths'
motion to dismiss certain claims and parties and to enter judgment. Along with the
Charles worths' motion papers, they served on the Reynses a proposed form of judgment,
which of course specifically set forth the principal amount to which the Charlesworths
believed they were entitled. (R. at 573.) Despite having a full opportunity to contest the
principal amount of the proposed Judgment, the Reynses did not raise this issue. In fact,
they did not respond at all. Accordingly, over one month after the Charlesworths
submitted their motion to dismiss certain claims and parties and to enter judgment, as
well as their proposed form of judgment, the trial court entered the same. {Id. at 572-75.)
Because the Reynses failed to raise this issue below, they have waived it for purposes of
appeal. State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 114, % 13, 61 P.3d 1062; Brookside Mobile Home
Parkt Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, \ 14, 48 P.3d 968.
C.

The Reynses Have Failed to Identify the Judgment Amount as an Issue
Before this Court

Finally, the Reynses have not identified an alleged error in the judgment amount
as an issue for this appeal. (Appellants' Br. at 1-2.) Instead, the Reynses appear to
merely use the alleged error in the Judgment as an illustration to support their claim that
an accounting is a prerequisite for any and all intra-partnership actions, regardless of the
circumstances of such actions. {See id. at 31.) As demonstrated above, however, there is
no need for an accounting in this action as a matter of law. The rules of this Court
require an Appellant to identify all issues presented for review, and to denominate them
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as such in a specific place in the brief. Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5). Given that the Reynses
merely use this issue for illustrative purposes, and have failed to identify it as being
presented for review, they have waived review of this issue.
For each of these independent reasons, the Court should not undertake review of
the amount of the Judgment.
CONCLUSION
The Reynses in essence acknowledge their misdeeds, and acknowledge that they
are possessed of ill-gotten financial benefit. They simply claim that they may keep the
fruits of their efforts because the Charlesworths failed to jump through a purported
accounting hoop and because the Charlesworths' allegedly acted too late to redress the
Reynses admitted actions, notwithstanding that they acted to conceal those very actions
from the Charlesworths. The law should not countenance such a result. In light of the
above undisputed facts and authorities, it does not. An accounting is not a prerequisite to
this action. Moreover, the applicable statutes of limitation were tolled until 1994. Thus,
the Charlesworths' claims at issue, filed in June 1997, were timely. Accordingly, the
Court should affirm the trial court's order and judgment.
DATED this

day of November, 2004.
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER

Arthur B. Berger
Carolynn Clark
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellees
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ADDENDUM

Tab A

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
The following statutes determinative of this appeal:
Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-4
In determining whether a partnership exists these rules shall apply:
(4)
The receipt by a person of a share of the profits of a business is prima facie
evidence that he is a partner in the business, but no such inference shall be drawn if such
profits were received in payment:
(a)
As a debt by installments or otherwise
(b)
As wages of an employee or rent to a landlord.
(c)
As an annuity to a widow or representative of a deceased partner.
(d)
As interest on a loan, though the amounts of payment vary with the
profits of the business.
(e)
As the consideration for the sale of the good will of a business or
other property by installments or otherwise.
Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-5
All property originally brought into the partnership stock, or subsequently
acquired by purchase or otherwise on account of the partnership, is partnership property.
Unless the contrary intention appears, property acquired with partnership funds in
partnership property.
Any estate in real property may be acquired in the partnership name. Title so
acquired can be conveyed only in the partnership name.
A conveyance to a partnership in the partnership name, though without words of
inheritance, passes the entire estate of the grantor, unless a contrary intent appears.
Utah Code Ann. $ 48-1-7
Where title to real property is in the name of one or more but not all of the
partners, and the record does not disclose the right of the partnership, the partners in
whose name the title stands may convey title to such property, but the partnership may
recover such property, if the partners' act does not bind the partnership under the
provisions of Section 48-1-6(1), unless the purchaser or his assignee is a holder for value
without knowledge.
Where the title to real property is in the name of one or more or all of the partners,
or in a third person in trust for the partnership, a conveyance executed by a partner in the
partnership name, or in his own name, passes the equitable interest of the partnership,
provided the act is one within the authority of the partner under the provisions of Section
48-1-(6)1.

Where the title to real property is in the names of all the partners a conveyance
executed by all the partners passes all their rights in such property.
Utah Code Ann, $ 48-1-18
Every partner must account to the partnership for any benefit, and hold as trustee
for it any profits, derived by him without the consent of the other partners from any
transaction connected with the formation, conduct or liquidation of the partnership or
from any use by him of its property.
This section applies also to the representatives of a deceased partner engaged in
the liquidation of the affairs of the partnership as the personal representatives of the last
surviving partner.
Utah Code Ann. 8 48-1-24
A conveyance by a partner of his interest in the partnership does not of itself
dissolve the partnership, or, as against the other partners in the absence of agreement,
entitle the assignee during the continuance of the partnership to interfere in the
management or administration of the partnership business or affairs, or to require any
information or account of partnership transactions, or to inspect the partnership books;
but it merely entitled the assignee to receive in accordance with his contract the profits to
which the assigning partner would otherwise be entitled
In case of a dissolution of partnership, the assignee is entitled to receive his
assignor's interest, and may require an account from the date only of the last account
agreed to by all the partners.
Utah Code Ann. S 48-1-27
On dissolution a partnership is not terminated, but continues until the winding up
of partnership affairs is completed.
Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-34
Unless otherwise agreed, the partners who have not wrongfully dissolved the
partnership or the legal representatives of the last surviving partner, not bankrupt, has the
right to wind up the partnership affairs; provided, however, that any partner, his legal
representatives or his assignee upon cause shown may obtain a winding up by the court.
Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-39
When any partner retires or dies and the business is continued under any of the
conditions set forth in Section 48-l-38(l),(2),(3),(5),(6), or Section 48-l-35(2)(b) without
any settlement of accounts as between him or his estate and the person or partnership
2

continuing the business, unless otherwise agreed, he or his legal representatives as against
such persons or partnership may have the value of his interest at the date of dissolution
ascertained, and shall receive as an ordinary creditor an amount equal to the value of his
interest in the dissolved partnership with interest, or, at his option or at the option of his
legal representatives, in lieu of interest, at the profits attributable to the use of his right in
the property of the dissolved partnership; provided, that the creditors of the dissolved
partnership as against the separate creditors or the 'representative of the retired or
deceased partner shall have priority on any claim arising under this section, as provided
by Section 48-1-38(8).
Utah Code Ann, § 48-1-40
The right to an account of his interest shall accrue to any partner or his legal
representative as against the winding-up partners or the surviving partners or the person
or partnership continuing the business, at the date of dissolution in the absence of any
agreement to the contrary.
Utah Code Ann, § 78-12-23
An action may be brought within six years:
(2) upon any contract, obligation, or liability founded upon an instrument in
writing, except those mentioned in Section 78-12-22.
Utah Code Ann, 8 78-12-25
An action may be brought within four years:
(3) for relief not otherwise provided for by law.
Utah Code Ann, 8 78-12-44
In any case founded on contract, when any part of the principal or interest shall
have been paid, or an acknowledgment of an existing liability, debt or claim, or any
promise to pay the same, shall have been made, an action may be brought within the
period prescribed for the same after such payment, acknowledgment or promise; but such
acknowledgment or promise must be in writing, signed by the party to be charged
thereby. When a right of action is barred by the provisions of any statute, it shall be
unavailable either as a cause of action or ground of defense.
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TabB

The Parties' Statements of Fact
Submitted in Their Summary Judgment Briefing to the Trial Court1
Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in
Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 187-197)
(The Parties)
1.
Shirlie J. Charlesworth was the
trustee under the Trust Agreement,
dated March 22, 1963. (Answer to
Am. Compl. HI.)

Reynses' Statement of Fact in Mem.
Opp. Mot. Summ. J. and in Supp.
Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 339-346)
Undisputed.

2.
The beneficiaries under the
Trust Agreement were Plaintiffs Jack
G. Charlesworth, Rennly J.
Charlesworth, Jace Martinson,
GayLee C. McEwan, and Mirid
Weidner. (IcL1J2.)

Undisputed.

3.
The Partnership, Ruell
Investment Co., is a Utah general
partnership doing business within the
State of Utah. (Am. Compl. U 3;
Answer to Am. Compl. f 3.)

Undisputed.

4.
Reyns is a general partner and
managing partner of the Partnership.
(Am. Compl. ^ 4; Answer to Am.
Compl. K 3.)

Undisputed.

5.

Undisputed.

1

Isom was a general partner of

Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in
Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 372-82)

Reynses' Statement of Fact in Replj
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 483-84)

All references to exhibits in this chart are to the exhibits submitted in connection with the parties' summary judgment briefing. These exhibits are part of the record on appeal.

I!harlesworths' Statement of Fact in
Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 187-197)

Reynses' Statement of Fact in Mem.
Opp. Mot. Summ. J. and in Supp.
Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 339-346)

Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in
Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 372-82)

he Partnership, and passed away in
[988. Her interest was succeeded to
)y Defendants Raymond Isom, Patrick
som, and Colleen Ruth Isom Findley.
Am. Compl. ffi| 5-7; Answer to Am.

bompl.K3.)
5.
Reyns is also a joint trustee
ander the Trust Agreement dated
August 27, 1985 (the "Reyns Family
Trust"). Her husband, Defendant Arie
William Reyns, and their son,
Defendant Alan W. Reyns, also serve
as joint trustees of the Reyns Family
Trust. The Reyns Family Trust
resides in Utah because it is
administered here. (Am. Compl.ffl[89; Answer to Am. Compl. ^ 3.)

Undisputed.

(The Contract)
7.
On March 22, 1963, Reyns and
Isom entered into the Contract for the
purchase of the Property from Mr. and
Mrs. Charlesworth for $100,000.
(Am. Compl. f 10; Answer to Am.
Compl. H 3.) A true and correct copy
of the Contract is filed herewith as
Exhibit 1. (Defs.' Response to Pis.'
First Req. for Admis. No. 11, filed
herewith as Exhibit 2.)

Undisputed.

?

Reynses9 Statement of Fact in Reply
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 483-84)

Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in
Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 187-197)
8.
Under the Contract, Reyns
owned, and owed the obligations
relating to, two-thirds of the Contract,
while Isom owned and was obligated
upon one-third of the Contract. The
Contract required installment
payments of $500 per month.
(Contract (Ex. 1) 1fl[ 2, 3; Answer to
Am. Compl. U 4.)
9.
Possession of the Property and
rents therefrom were assigned to
Reyns and Isom as of April 1, 1963.
(Contract (Ex. 1)1J4.)

Reynses' Statement of Fact in Mem.
Opp. Mot. Summ. J. and in Supp.
Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 339-346)
Undisputed.

Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in
Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 372-82)

Undisputed.

10. Reyns was permitted under the
Contract to convey one-half of her
interest in the Contract to Shirhe
Charlesworth, m trust, for the use and
benefit of her children—the Plaintiffs
and moving parties as identified
above. (IdL1[12.)

Undisputed.

(The Partnership Agreement)
11. On March 22, 1963, the same
date the Contract was executed, Reyns
and Isom entered into the Partnership
Agreement establishing the
Partnership. (Am. Compl. H 13;
Answer to Am. Compl. ^ 3.) A true
and correct copy of the Partnership
Agreement is filed herewith as Exhibit

Undisputed.
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Reynses' Statement of Fact in Reply
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 483-84)

Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in
Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 187-197)

Reynses' Statement of Fact in Mem.
Opp. Mot. Summ. J. and in Supp.
Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 339-346)

Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in
Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 372-82)

3. (Defs.' Response to Pis.' First Req.
for Admis. (Ex. 2) No. 13.)
12. Reyns was designated the
managing partner, and was required to
operate and manage the property,
collect rents from tenants, keep
financial records, not commingle
partnership funds with any other
funds, and at least annually disburse
profits in excess of the obligations of
the Partnership (including its payment
obligations under the Contract), to the
partners according to their respective
interests in the Partnership.
(Partnership Agreement (Ex. 3)ffll4,
5,7; Compl ^J 15; Answer to Am.
Compl. ^| 3.) Reyns was given the
discretion to determine the portion of
profits to be distributed and the
portion to be retained by the
Partnership. (Partnership Agreement
(Ex. 3) H 7.)

Undisputed.

13. As their initial capital
contributions to the Partnership, Reyns
and Isom each assigned their
respective interests in the Contract to
the Partnership. (Answer to Am.
Compl. H 5.) The Contract, and the
Property purchased thereunder, were

Undisputed.

A

Reynses' Statement of Fact in Reply |
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 483-84)

1 Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in
Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 187-197)

Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in
Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 372-82)

Reynses' Statement of Fact in Mem.
Opp. Mot. Summ. J. and in Supp.
Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 339-346)

1 and remained the principal assets of
the Partnership.
1 14. The Partnership Agreement
expressly noted that Reyns intended to
transfer one-half of her interest in the
Contract (i.e., a one-third interest in
the entire Contract) to Shirlie
Charlesworth in trust for her children.
(Partnership Agreement (Ex. 3) U 6.)
Reyns and Isom expressly consented
to such transfer, "provided the said
Trustee takes the same subject to this
Partnership Agreement." (Id.)
Importantly, the Partnership
Agreement further provided that
"[a]fter said transfer, the Trustee shall
own one-third, and each party hereto
[Reyns and Isom] shall own one-third
of the contract." (Id)

Undisputed.

|

Undisputed.

(The Trust Agreement)
15. Contemporaneous with the
execution of the Contract and the
Partnership Agreement, Reyns
assigned one-half of her two-thirds
interest in the Contract (i.e., a onej third interest in the entire Contract) to
Shirlie Charlesworth, as trustee for her
children. (Trust Agreement 1J 1, a true
and correct copy of which is filed

5

Reynses' Statement of Fact in Repl;
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 483-84)

Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in
Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 187-197)

Reynses' Statement of Fact in Mem.
Opp. Mot. Summ. J. and in Supp.
Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 339-346)

Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in
Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 372-82)

herewith as Exhibit 4 (Dels.'
Response to Pis.' First Req. for
Admis. (Ex. 2) No. 12).)
16. The Trust Agreement provided
that Shirhe Charlesworth (as trustee),
Reyns, and Isom "each own an
undivided one-third interest in [the
CJontract." (Trust Agreement (Ex. 4)

Undisputed.

ID
17. The Trust Agreement further
specified that the "trustee by accepting
this trust and the duties and rights of
trustee thereby becomes a partner m
[the Partnership." (Id U 2.)

Undisputed.

18. Thus, as a result of Reyns'
assignment, Shirhe Charlesworth, as
trustee, held a one-third interest m the
Contract and also became an equal
one-third partner in the Partnership.

Undisputed.

a m i.2.)
19. The trust was to terminate by its
own terms upon the happening of
certain contingencies, including the
satisfaction of the payment obligations
under the Contract and/or when the
beneficiaries attained their majority,
i (Id H 6.)

Undisputed.

f*

Reynses' Statement of Fact in Reply
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 483-84)

1 Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in
Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 187-197)

Reynses' Statement of Fact in Mem.
Opp. Mot. Summ. J. and in Supp.
Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 339-346)

I 20. Regardless of how the Trust was
to terminate, the end result was that
the beneficiaries or the heirs of any
non-surviving beneficiaries were to
own, among other things, their
respective portions of the trust
principal. (Id.)

Undisputed.

1 21. As it turned out, the payment
obligation under the Contract was not
satisfied until after all of the
beneficiaries turned 21. (See Shirlie
Charlesworth Dep. at 5:22 to 6:5, a
true and correct copy of which is filed
herewith as Exhibit 5; Am. Compl. U
22; Answer to Am. Compl. ^| 3.) In
that instance, "all allocated income
and all of the interest in the trust
principal shall be or have been
distributed to the beneficiaries free
and clear of the trust." (Trust
Agreement (Ex. 4) ^ 6.)

1.
Paragraph 21 of Plaintiffs
statement of undisputed facts is a
correct statement that once the
payment obligation under the contract
was satisfied, and the Plaintiffs had
attained the age of majority, the trust
was to be dissolved and the trust
corpus distributed outright to the
beneficiaries of the trust. However,
Plaintiff Shirlie J. Charlesworth, the
Trustee of the trust, took no action to
see that the trust provisions were
carried out, that any property or
partnership interests were conveyed to
her children, the beneficiaries of the
trust, or even that trust records were
maintained. Plaintiff Shirlie J.
Charlesworth, as Trustee of the trust,
took no action whatsoever to
safeguard the interests of her children
under the trust. Deposition of Shirlie
Charlesworth, 17:1-3, 17:25-18:2.
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Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in
Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 372-82)

Reynses9 Statement of Fact in Replj
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 483-84)

1.
In paragraph 1 of their
statement of fact, Defendants agree
with paragraph 21 of Plaintiffs'
statement of fact, but allege that
Shirlie Charlesworth took no action to
safeguard the interests of her children
under the trust, including ensuring that
the trust provisions were carried out
and that property or partnership
interests were conveyed to Plaintiffs.
Defendants further allege that
Plaintiffs failed to take action to
become partners in their own right.
These purported facts
mischaracterize the record.
Defendants ignore the fact that the
trust terminated, by its own terms, with
respect to each of the Plaintiffs as they
respectively attained their majority,
and that the former trust beneficiaries
would directly own their respective
portions of the trust principal, namely

Undisputed.

Charlesworths5 Statement of Fact in
Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 187-197)

Reynses' Statement of Fact in Mem.
Opp. Mot. Summ. J. and in Supp.
Cross-Mot Summ. J.
(R. at 339-346)
Additionally, as Plaintiffs' point out,
the trust was to terminate in 1982
when the contract was paid. Under
Plaintiffs' theory, they should have
become partners in their own
individual right in 1982. Instead,
Plaintiffs took no action, and, as
hereinafter explained, the partnership
dissolved in 1982.

Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in Reynses' Statement of Fact in Reply
Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 483-84)
(R. at 372-82)
a one-third share of the Contract and
the Partnership. (Pis.'Statement of
Fact ffl[ 19-20 (Defendants do not
dispute this point).) For example, the
trust agreement, of which Reyns
herself was the Settlor, specifically
stated that all "'income and all of the
interest in the trust principal'" were to
be made to the Plaintiffs "'free and
clear of the trust'" once the Plaintiffs
had attained their majority. (Id ^| 21
(quoting Trust Agreement)
(Defendants do not dispute this
point).) There is nothing whatsoever
in the record to suggest that Plaintiffs
were required to take any action to
become partners. Reyns herself
recognized this fact by making
distributions directly to the Plaintiffs
once they had attained their majority
and by expressly reciting that
Plaintiffs were partners in the
Schedule K-ls she sent them. (Id. ffl[
34, 35 (Defendants do not dispute this
point).) Moreover, by the time the
contract was paid off, the trust
agreement had already terminated
because all of the Plaintiffs had
attained their majority by several
years, and owned their partnership
interests outright. (Id tH 19-21
|

Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in
Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 187-197)

Reynses' Statement of Fact in Mem.
Opp. Mot. Summ. J. and in Supp.
Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 339-346)

Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in
Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 372-82)
(Defendants do not dispute these
points).) Thus, Shirlie Charlesworth's
duty to protect the Plaintiffs' interest
in the trust had extinguished.
Arguably, the only duty of
Shirlie Charlesworth that may have
continued after the Plaintiffs reached
their majority was in connection with
the Quitclaim Deed from Reyns to
Shirlie Charlesworth, which was to be
delivered to Shirlie and recorded when
the contract for purchase of the
Property was paid. (Id, ^ 24
(Defendants do not dispute this
point).) However, Shirlie testified in
her deposition that the entire
arrangement concerning the
Partnership, the Contract, and the
Trust Agreement had been set up by
Ben Charlesworth and his lawyer, and
that she did not participate in the
arrangements. Mr. Charlesworth
presented Shirlie with the Trust
Agreement in his lawyer's office, and
explained to her that the arrangement
was for his grandchildren (the
Plaintiffs), to help with college. He
further explained that Plaintiffs would
have a one-third ownership interest in
the Contract and the Partnership, and
would own one-third of the

Reynses' Statement of Fact in Replj
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 483-84)

Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in
Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 187-197)

Reynses' Statement of Fact in Mem.
Opp. Mot. Summ. J. and in Supp.
Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 339-346)

(Additional Evidence Supporting
Plaintiffs' Interest in the
Partnership)
22. The Contract required several
documents to be placed in escrow at
Commercial Security Bank in Ogden,
Utah, including the following: a copy
of the Contract; an escrow agreement
executed contemporaneously with the
Contract; and a Warranty Deed to the
Property, conveying the Property from
Mr. and Mrs. Charlesworth to Reyns
and Isom, which Warranty Deed was
to be delivered to Reyns and Isom
upon completion of the payments
required under the Contract. (Contract

Undisputed.

Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in
Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 372-82)
apartments. He then asked Shirlie to
sign the Trust Agreement, and she
gratefully did. Mr. Charlesworth did
not show her any other documents
related to the transaction, such as the
Partnership Agreement or the
Quitclaim Deed. Specifically, Shirlie
Charlesworth was never aware of the
existence of the Quitclaim Deed until
around the time this suit was filed.
(See Shirlie Charlesworth Dep. at
7:13-25, 9:4-10:25, 12:2-13:9, 18:3-7,
18:16-19:16, a true and correct copy
of which is filed herewith as Exhibit
16.)
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Reynses' Statement of Fact in Reply
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 483-84)

Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in
Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 187-197)

Reynses' Statement of Fact in Mem.
Opp. Mot. Summ. J. and in Supp.
Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 339-346)

Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in
Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 372-82)

Reynses' Statement of Fact in Reply
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 483-84)

2.
In paragraph 2 of their
statement of fact, Defendants agree
with paragraph 24 of Plaintiffs'
statement of fact, but mischaracterize
Shirlie Charlesworth's purported
duties. See Plaintiffs' response to
paragraph 1 above.

Undisputed.

(Ex. I)1ffl8, 11; Am.Compl.K12;
Answer to Am. Compl. H 3.)
1 23. The Contract further provided
that in the event Reyns conveyed onehalf of her interest in the Contract to
Shirlie Charlesworth, as trustee, prior
to the delivery of the documents in
escrow to Reyns and Isom - which
Reyns did - "the trust deed from . . .
Reyns to Shirlee [sic] Charlesworth
shall also be deposited in escrow and
held by the escrow agent until the total
purchase price has been paid in full."
(Contract (Ex. 1)1(12.)
24. The Trust Agreement echoed
and clarified the Contract's dictate.
The Trust Agreement provided: "To
further carry out this assignment the
Settlor [Reyns] has executed her Quit
Claim Deed to an undivided one-third
of the trust property in favor of
Trustee [Shirlie Charlesworth], which
deed shall be deposited in escrow with
the escrow holder named in the
contract assigned and held by it until
the contract principal is paid in full, at
which time it will be delivered by the
escrow holder to the Trustee and by
her recorded." (Trust Agreement (Ex.

Undisputed.

2.
Paragraph 24 of Plaintiffs
statement of facts correctly states the
terms of the trust agreement which
provided that the Trustee, Plaintiff
Shirlie Charlesworth, was under an
obligation to deliver the trust assets to
the beneficiaries upon the dissolution
of the trust. The escrow instructions,
Exhibit 6 to Plaintiffs motion,'
specifically provide that the Quit
Claim Deed from Ruth C. Reyns to
Shirlie Charlesworth was to be
delivered by the escrow agent to
Shirlie Charlesworth. Again, Shirlie
Charlesworth took no action to see

11

Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in
Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 187-197)
4)110.)

Charlesworths9 Statement of Fact in
Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 372-82)

Reynses' Statement of Fact in Mem.
Opp. Mot. Summ. J. and in Supp.
Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 339-346)
that the provisions of the trust were
carried out, that the interests of the
beneficiaries were protected or to
ascertain whether the escrow agent did
its duty. See response to statement of
facts U 21, above.

25. A true and correct copy of the
Escrow Agreement is filed herewith as
Exhibit 6. (Defs.'Response to Pis.'
First Req. for Admis. (Ex. 2) Nos. 35.)

Undisputed.

26. As prescribed in the Contract
and the Trust Agreement, the Escrow
Agreement provided that, among other
things, the Warranty Deed conveying
the Property from Mr. and Mrs.
Charlesworth to Reyns and Isom shall
be delivered to Reyns and Isom when
the Contract purchase price was paid
in full. (Escrow Agreement (Ex. 6) at
1.)

Undisputed.

Reynses' Statement of Fact in Reply
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 483-84)

•

10

Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in
Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 187-197)
27. Also as prescribed m the
Contract and the Trust Agreement, the
Escrow Agreement further provided
that at the same time the Warranty
Deed was delivered to Reyns and
Isom, "the Quit Claim Deed from
Ruth C. Reyns to Shirlee [sic]
Charlesworth . . shall be delivered to
the Grantee therein," namely Shirhe
Charlesworth. fid.)

Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in
Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 372-82)

Reynses' Statement of Fact in Mem.
Opp. Mot. Summ. J. and in Supp.
Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 339-346)
Undisputed.

28. Filed herewith as Exhibit 7 is a
true and correct copy of the Quit
Claim Deed, dated March 29, 1963,
from Reyns to Shirhe Charlesworth,
which bears Reyns's signature.
(Defs.' Response to Pis.' First Req. for
Admis. (Ex. 2) Nos. 1-2.)

Undisputed.

29. In the Quit Claim Deed, Reyns
grants an undivided one-third interest
in the Property such that, after
recordation of the Quit Claim Deed,
the Property will be owned "an
undivided one-third by RUTH C.
REYNS, an undivided one-third by
ELLEN C. ISOM, an undivided onethird by SHIRLEE [sic]
CHARLESWORTH, TRUSTEE, as
tenants in common." (Quit Claim
Deed (Ex. 7) at 1.)

Undisputed.
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Reynses' Statement of Fact in Reply
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 483-84)

Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in
Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 187-197)

Reynses' Statement of Fact in Mem.
Opp. Mot. Summ. J. and in Supp.
Cross-Mot, Summ. J.
(R. at 339-346)

Charlesworths9 Statement of Fact in
Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 372-82)

30. On or about October 6, 1983,
when the purchase price was paid in
full, the Warranty Deed, filed herewith
as Exhibit 8, was delivered to Reyns.
(Am. Compl. ^ 22; Answer to Am.
Comply 3.)

3.
Paragraph 30 of the Plaintiffs'
statement of facts correctly states that
"on or about October 6, 1983, when
the purchase price was paid in full, the
Warranty Deed, filed herewith as
Exhibit "A", was delivered to Reyns."
Additionally, this Warranty Deed,
which conveyed the apartments from
Ben Charlesworth to Ruth C. Reyns as
to an undivided two-thirds interest,
and to Ellen C. Isom as to an
undivided one-third interest, was
recorded the same day, 10 October
1983, in the office of the Weber
County Recorder at Book 1433, Page
1443, as entry number 892145. See
Exhibit 8.

3.

31. Although the Escrow Agreement
directs that the Quit Claim Deed be
delivered to Shirlie Charlesworth,
(Escrow Agreement (Ex. 6) at 1), it
appears that the Quit Claim Deed was
actually delivered to Reyns.

Undisputed.

32. Filed herewith as Exhibit 9 is a
Commercial Security Bank escrow
receipt bearing Reyns's signature,
wherein she acknowledges receipt of
1 the Quit Claim Deed. (Defs.'

Undisputed.
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Undisputed.

Reynses' Statement of Fact in Reply
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 483-84)

| Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in
Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 187-197)
Response to Pis.' First Req. for
Admis. (Ex. 2) No. 6; Reyns Dep. at
73:13-22, a true and correct copy of
which is filed herewith as Exhibit 10.)
i The escrow receipt states that the
subject escrow has been paid in full,
and notes that the following
documents have been forwarded to
Reyns: (a) the "Contract;" (b)
"Warranty Deed Charlesworth to
Reyns and Isom; and Quit Claim Deed
Reyns to Shirlee [sic] Charlesworth"
and (c) "Abstracts of Title." (Escrow
Receipt (Ex. 9).) Appearing above
Reyns's signature is the legend
"Received enclosures above
described:' (Id)
33. Shirlie Charlesworth and the
children never received the Quit Claim
Deed. (Rennly Charlesworth Dep. at
10:10-14, 11:7-10, a copy of which is
filed herewith as Exhibit 11; Shirlie
Charlesworth Dep. (Ex. 5) at 18:3-18.)

34.

In addition to the terms of the

Reynses' Statement of Fact in Mem.
Opp. Mot. Summ. J. and in Supp.
Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 339-346)

Charlesworths9 Statement of Fact in
Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 372-82)

Reynses' Statement of Fact in Reply
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 483-84)

4.
Paragraph 33 of Plaintiffs'
statement of facts states that "Shirlie
Charlesworth and the children never
received the quit claim deed." Even
though she would have been under an
obligation as the Trustee of the trust to
protect and safeguard the trust
interests, by her own admission,
Shirlie Charlesworth took no action.
See response to ^ 21 above.

4.
In paragraph 4 of their
statement of fact, Defendants agree
with paragraph 33 of Plaintiffs'
statement of fact, but mischaracterize
Shirlie Charlesworth's purported
duties. See Plaintiffs' response to
paragraph 1 above. The Court should
also note that it is undisputed that the
Quitclaim Deed was delivered to
Reyns. (Plfs.' Statement of Fact ffif
31, 32 (Defendants do not dispute this
fact).)

Undisputed.

5.

5.

Undisputed.

In response to paragraph 34,
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In paragraph 5 of their

Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in
Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 187-197)

Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in
Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 372-82)
statement of fact, Defendants agree
with paragraph 34 of Plaintiffs'
statement of fact, but mischaracterize
the issue of post 1985 distributions.
Defendants contend that no
distributions, except for one or two in
small amounts, were made to Plaintiffs
after 1985. Defendants'statement is
inaccurate. First, the statement itself
acknowledges that at least one or two
distributions were in fact made after
1985. Second, Defendants do not
contest Plaintiffs' statement that the
Schedule K-ls that Reyns delivered to
Plaintiffs through 1993 reflected
distributions in the form of
adjustments to the Plaintiffs' capital
accounts in the Partnership. (Plfs.'
Statement of Factffi[35-37
(Defendants do not dispute these
facts).) Some years the K-ls reflected
income to the Plaintiffs, while in
others the K-ls reflected losses. (Id.)

Reynses' Statement of Fact in Mem.
Opp. Mot. Summ. J. and in Supp.
Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 339-346)
Escrow Agreement, the Quit Claim
the Court should note the last sentence
Deed, and the Escrow Receipt,
thereof: "Reyns continued making
Reyns's own actions support
payments to the children until at least
Plaintiffs' interest in the Partnership
1985 - over ten years after the
and the Property. Over a period of
youngest child had obtained his
almost thirty years, Reyns engaged in
majority and sixteen years after the
a number of acts consistent with such
oldest child had attained his majority."
interest and the terms of the Contract,
It is an undisputed fact that no
the Partnership Agreement, and the
distributions, with the exception of
Trust Agreement described above.
one or two minimal checks, were
For example, Reyns, as managing
made by Defendants to Plaintiffs after
partner and on behalf of the
1985. Plaintiff Rennly J.
Partnership, collected rents, made the
Charlesworth testified as follows:
payments due under the Contract,
Q.
And you don't recall receiving
maintained the Property, and for
any money from Rueli Investment,
twenty years paid the net profits, if
except maybe once or twice in a very
any, to the partners annually. (Am.
small amount since your father's
Compl. H 21; Answer to Am. Compl. ^ death?
3.) Reyns paid one-third of the profits A.
Correct.
to herself, one-third to Isom (and later Q.
And he passed away [when]?
to her heirs), and one-third to the
A.
August 1985.
children. (Reyns Dep. (Ex. 10) at
24:5-25:14,136:2-10.) Initially,
Reyns delivered the profits to Shirlie
Charlesworth's husband, who would
deliver the payments to the children.
(Id at 24:5-26:4.) Reyns began to
deliver the payments directly to the
children as they respectively reached
their majority. Reyns continued
making payments to the children until

f,

Reynses' Statement of Fact in Reply
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 483-84)

Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in
Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 187-197)

Reynses' Statement of Fact in Mem.
Opp. Mot. Summ. J. and in Supp.
Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 339-346)

Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in
Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 372-82)

at least 1985—over ten years after the
youngest child had attained his
majority and sixteen years after the
oldest child had attained his majority.
(Id at 32:24-33:19, 38:17-24.)
35. Even though she ceased making
outright payments to the children,
Reyns continued to send them
Schedules K-l of Form 1065, titled
"Partner's Share of Income, Credits,
Deductions, Etc.," (id at 38:23-39:2),
which, as discussed below, reflected
income to the children in the form of
increased capital accounts and also
expressly recited their status as
general partners in the Partnership.

Undisputed.

36. In fact, Reyns provided
Schedule K-l tax statements to the
partners, including to each of the
Plaintiffs, from the inception of the
Partnership through the 1992 tax year.
True and correct copies of samples of
such K-l statements, including the
1982, 1988, 1991, and 1992 K-ls for
Rennly Charlesworth; the 1990, 1991,
and 1992 K-ls for Jace Charlesworth;
the 1988, 1989, 1991, and 1992 K-ls
for Mirid Weidner; the 1991 and 1992
K-ls for Gaylee McEwan; and the

Undisputed.
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Reynses' Statement of Fact in Reply
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 483-84)

Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in
Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 187-197)

Reynses' Statement of Fact in Mem.
Opp. Mot. Summ. J. and in Supp.
Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 339-346)

Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in
Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 372-82)

1991 and 1992 K-ls for Jack Gilles
Charlesworth are filed herewith as
Exhibit 12. (Reyns Dep. (Ex. 10) at
92:3-13; 96:12-23; 101:2-9; 114:1317; 116:20-24; 118:23-119:9.)
37. In each of these K-ls, the
Plaintiffs were expressly referred to as
"general partners." (Schedule K-ls
(Ex. 12) Line A.) The K-ls also
reflected that each of the Plaintiffs
owned one-fifth of one-third (6.67%)
of the profits, losses, and ownership of
capital of the Partnership. (Id. Line C
of 1982 K-l, Line E of 1988 and 1990
K-ls, and Line F of remaining K-ls.)
The K-ls further reflected that each of
the Plaintiffs had a capital account,
(14 Line E of 1982 K-l, Line K of
1988 and 1990 K-ls, and Line J of
remaining K-ls), and that each
Plaintiff incurred income and/or
losses, (id Lines 1-2).

Undisputed.

38. The Schedules K-l for all of the
partners, including the children, were
prepared by an accountant, however
Reyns provided the accountant with
the information appearing therein.
(See, e.g., Reyns Dep. (Ex. 10) at
89:7-14; 90:11-92:2; 97:24-98:7;

Undisputed.
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Reynses' Statement of Fact in Reply
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 483-84)

Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in
Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 187-197)

Reynses' Statement of Fact in Mem.
Opp. Mot. Summ. J. and in Supp.
Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 339-346)

Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in
Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 372-82)

101:2-9; 118:5-121:10.) Once the
Partnership K-ls were prepared,
Reyns reviewed them for accuracy
before filing them with the federal
government. (See, e.g., id. at 83:1284:6; 90:11-92:2; 94:25-95:18; 96:1223; 97:24-98:9.) She also directly sent
each of the partners, including the
children, their respective K-l forms.
(See, e.g., i d at 90:11-92:2; 95:13-18;
96:12-23; 120:11-15.)
39. In connection with the
preparation of the Partnership's 1992
tax return, Reyns recalls having a
discussion with the Partnership's
accountant about whether the children
were general partners of the
Partnership. She cannot recall the
content of the conversation, however
the accountant thereafter prepared the
returns in a manner expressly
reflecting the children's interest as
general partners, and Reyns delivered
the K-ls reflecting that interest to the
children. (Id at 101:2-103:6.)

Undisputed.

(Reyns's Clandestine Transfer of
Plaintiffs' Interest in the Property
to The Reyns Family Trust)
40. On August 27, 1985,

6.
Paragraph 40 of the Plaintiffs
statement of fact correctly states that
on 27 August 1985, Defendant Ruth
Reyns conveyed her two-thirds

6.
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Undisputed.

Reynses' Statement of Fact in Reply
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 483-84)

Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in
Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 187-197)

Reynses' Statement of Fact in Mem.
Opp. Mot. Summ. J. and in Supp.
Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 339-346)
notwithstanding the Plaintiffs7 interest interest in the property to a family
in the Partnership, Reyns conveyed by trust established by her and her
warranty deed a two-thirds interest in
husband for estate planning purposes.
the Property to herself, Arie William
See Exhibit 13. Said Warranty Deed
Reyns, and Alan W. Reyns, as joint
was recorded in the office of the
trustees under the Trust Agreement
Weber County Recorder at Book
dated August 27, 1985 ("Reyns
1474, Page 807, as Entry Number
Family Trust"). (Answer to Am.
946014 on 28 August 1985. See
Compl. 1] 12.) A true and correct copy Exhibit 13.
of the warranty deed is filed herewith
as Exhibit 13.
41. The j oint trustees under the
Reyns Family Trust tendered no
consideration to the Partnership in
connection with the transfer. (Am.
Compl. U 26; Answer to Am. Compl. ^
3.)

7.
Paragraph 41 of the Plaintiffs
statement of facts correctly states that
the Reyns' family trust tendered no
consideration to the partnership in
return for the transfer of Ruth Reyns
interest in said partnership.
Additionally, when the documents
were executed in 1963, the
Charlesworth trust of which Shirlie J.
Charlesworth was the trustee, gave no
consideration for the transfer of any
property or partnership interest to said
trust. Deposition of Shirlie
Charlesworth, 11:5-10.

42. Notwithstanding the requirement
in the Partnership Agreement that the
Agreement not be modified absent the
consent of all of the parties thereto and

Undisputed.

Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in
Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 372-82)

7.

90

Undisputed.

Reynses' Statement of Fact in Reply
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 483-84)

Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in
Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 187-197)

Reynses' Statement of Fact in Mem.
Opp. Mot. Summ. J. and in Supp.
Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 339-346)

Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in
Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 372-82)

Reynses' Statement of Fact in Reply
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 483-84)

43. Reyns did not give Shirhe
Charlesworth or the children notice of
the transfer. (Reyns Dep. (Ex. 10)
81:17-21.)

8.
Paragraph 43 states that
"Reyns did not give Shirhe
Charlesworth or her children notice of
the [transfer of her interest m the
property to Reyns' family trust]." The
transaction was a matter of public
record by virtue of the recordation of
the deed m the office of the Weber
County Recorder on 28 August 1985.

8.
Plaintiffs do not dispute that
Reyns failed to give Shirhe
Charlesworth or Plaintiffs notice of
Reyns's transfer of the Property to the
Reyns family trust, but dispute the
legal principal alleged by Defendants
in this paragraph. Although the
"transaction was a matter of public
record" by virtue of the fact that it was
recorded with the County Recorder,
Plaintiffs contend that such recording
did not operate to give them actual or
constructive notice because the
recording statute only affords such
notice to those with a duty to
investigate, such as a potential
purchaser of the property.

Undisputed.

44. In fact, Reyns took affirmative
steps to hide this transfer by
continuing to provide Schedules K-l
to the children, which Schedules
reflected the children's continued
interest in the Partnership, the

9.
In paragraph 44 of the
Plaintiffs statement of facts, the
Plaintiffs claim that "Reyns took
affirmative steps to hide this transfer"
by providing schedules K-l to the
children after 1985. Even though the

9.
Plaintiffs dispute the
allegations in paragraph 9 of
Defendants' Statement of Facts to the
extent they suggest that no payments
were made to Plaintiffs after 1985,
that such alleged fact should have

Undisputed.

' their successors, Reyns did not obtain
authorization from anyone, including
the partners of the Partnership, to
make the transfer. (Partnership
Agreement (Ex. 3) ^ 8; Answer to Am.
Comply 13.)
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Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in
Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 187-197)
principal assets of which were the
Contract and the Property purchased
thereunder. (See supra ^ 36.)

45. The transfer did not affect
Isom's one-third interest in the
Partnership Property. Isom retained
her one-third interest in the Property
after Reyns transferred the two-thirds
interest in the Partnership Property to
the Reyns Family Trust. (See Answer

Reynses' Statement of Fact in Mem.
Opp. Mot. Summ. J. and in Supp.
Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 339-346)
children received schedules K-l,
which in some instances reflected a
distribution of capital to them, the
undisputed evidence is that following
1985 no payments were made to them.
It is difficult to understand how receipt
of a schedule K-l reflecting a
distribution which one never received
could be considered affirmative steps
to hide the transfer." To the contrary,
such discrepancy should have raised a
question in Plaintiffs' minds. But,
Plaintiffs took no action. Deposition
of Rennly J. Charlesworth 6:11-24
(stating that the only discussions since
reaching the age of majority plaintiff
Rennly Charlesworth had with
Defendants occurred in 1994);
Deposition of Shirlie J. Charlesworth
11:1-4 (responding to question about
discussions with Defendants in 1963,
answering "we never discussed [the
partnership] to much ever.)".
Undisputed.

9?

Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in
Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 372-82)
raised a question in Plaintiffs' minds,
and that Plaintiffs' took no action.
Each of these allegations is inaccurate,
as explained in paragraphs 5-21 of
Plaintiffs' Additional Statement of
Fact below.

Reynses' Statement of Fact in Reply
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 483-84)

Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in
Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 187-197)

Reynses' Statement of Fact in Mem.
Opp. Mot. Summ. J. and in Supp.
Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 339-346)

Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in
Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 372-82)

to Am. Compl. H 17; infra ffi[ 46-54.)
46. Isom died in 1988, causing a
Undisputed.
dissolution of the Partnership,
l however the partnership was not
wound up. (Am. Compl. % 29; Answer
to Am. Compl. 1J3.)
47. On January 4, 1990, Isom's
personal representative and former
husband, Raymond Isom, executed a
deed transferring Isom's one-third
interest in the Property to Raymond
Isom, Patrick Isom, and Colleen
Findley. (Am. Compl. ^ 29; Answer
to Am. Compl. ^ 3.)

Undisputed.

(Sale of the Property Unbeknownst
to the Plaintiffs)
48. On or about June 6, 1996, the
joint trustees of the Reyns Family
Trust and Raymond Isom,
respectively, sold and conveyed the
entire Property to third parties.
(Answer to Am. Compl. ^ 17.)

Undisputed.

49. A true and correct copy of the
Real Estate Purchase Contract is filed
herewith as Exhibit 14. (Reyns Dep.
(Ex. 10) at 126:11-127:1.) A counter
offer included in the Real Estate

Undisputed.
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Reynses' Statement of Fact in Reply
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 483-84)

Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in
Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 187-197)

Reynses' Statement of Fact in Mem.
Opp. Mot. Summ. J. and in Supp.
Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 339-346)

Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in
Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 372-82)

Purchase Contract signed by Reyns
and her husband Arie William Reyns
indicated that that the seller was "a
partnership," namely "Ruell
Investments," and clarified that the
sale was "subject to the approval of all
partners." (Counter Offer No. l,Real
Estate Purchase Contract (Ex. 14) at
5.)
50. An addendum to the counter
offer included in the Real Estate
Purchase Contract memorialized that
the seller's agreement to the sale was
made by Reyns, and by Arie William
Reyns, Raymond Isom, and Colleen
Findley. (Reyns Dep. (Ex. 10) at
129:10-22; Addendum to Counter
Offer, Real Estate Purchase Contract
(Ex. 14) at 6.) The Isom/Findleys
stated that their approval of the sale
was contingent on them receiving onethird of the sale proceeds. (Addendum
to Counter Offer, Real Estate Purchase
Contract (Ex. 14) at 6.)

Undisputed.

51. The Property was transferred to
the buyers through warranty deeds,
two of which are filed herewith as
Exhibit 15. The first was executed by
Reyns, Arie William Reyns, and Alan

Undisputed.

A

Reynses' Statement of Fact in Reply
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J. 1
(R. at 483-84)

Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in
Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 187-197)

Reynses' Statement of Fact in Mem.
Opp. Mot. Summ. J. and in Supp.
Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 339-346)

Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in
Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 372-82)

W. Reyns, as trustees of the Reyns
Family Trust. The second was
executed by Raymond E. Isom.
(Reyns Dep. (Ex. 10) at 130:4-15,
132:16-23.) Reyns believes that
Colleen Findley and Patrick Isom may
have also executed warranty deeds in
favor of the buyers. (Id. at 132:24133:9.)
52. Neither the joint trustees of the
Reyns Family Trust nor Raymond
Isom obtained authorization from the
Plaintiffs to make such transfer of the
Property. (Am. Compl. ^ 34; Answer
to Am. Compl. U 3; R. Reyns Dep. at
124:13-125:4.)

Undisputed.

53. The joint trustees of the Reyns
Family Trust, Raymond Isom, Patrick
Isom, and Colleen Findley together
received consideration from the
purchasers of the Property of
$350,000, including cash in the
amount of $297,500 and a promissory
note in the amount of $52,500.
(Reyns Dep. (Ex. 10) at 106:2-7,
123:8-20; Real Estate Purchase
Contract (Ex. 14) at 1.)

Undisputed.

54.

Undisputed.

One-third of the $297,000 cash
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Reynses' Statement of Fact in Reply
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 483-84)

Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in
Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 187-197)

Reynses' Statement of Fact in Mem.
Opp. Mot. Summ. J. and in Supp.
Cross-Mot Summ. J.
(R. at 339-346)

Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in
Reply Mem. Supp. Mot, Summ. J.
and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 372-82)

Reynses' Statement of Fact in Reply
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J. i
(R. at 483-84)

10.

Undisputed.

payment was paid to the Isoms, and
the remainder was paid to the Reyns
Family Trust. (Reyns Dep. (Ex. 10) at
123:21-124:6.) The buyers later paid
the balance of the purchase price,
namely $52,500. (Id at 123:8-124:8.)
The $52,500 was distributed to the
Isoms and the Reyns Family Trust in
the same proportion as the initial cash
payment, namely one-third of the
payment was made to the Isoms and
two-thirds was made to the Reyns
Family Trust.
55. Reyns never gave Shirlie
Charlesworth or the Plaintiffs notice
of the sale of the Property. (Reyns
Dep. (Ex. 10) at 125:25-126:5.)
Plaintiffs did not learn of the sale until
the summer of 1997 (Rennly
Charlesworth Dep. (Ex. 11) at 8:1017.)

Undisputed.

56. Defendants have never paid any
of the sale proceeds of the Property to
Shirlie Charlesworth or Plaintiffs.
(Am. Compl. ^ 37; Answer to Am.
Comply.)

Undisputed.

10.
In addition to the foregoing
acceptance of Plaintiffs' statement of

Ofs

Paragraph 10 of

Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in
Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 187-197)

Reynses' Statement of Fact in Mem.
Opp. Mot. Summ. J. and in Supp.
Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 339-346)
facts, together with the abovedescribed clarifications, Defendants
submit the following additional
undisputed facts.

Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in
Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 372-82)
Defendants' Statement of Facts
does not contain any factual
averments. It merely reiterates that
Defendants "accept[] Plaintiffs'
statement of facts, together with
the above-described clarifications."
It then states that the remainder of
Defendants' Statement of Facts
consists of additional and
purportedly undisputed facts.

Reynses' Statement of Fact in Reply
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 483-84)

11.
In 1982 the contract on the
apartments was paid off and the
escrow agent, Commercial Security
Bank, released the warranty deed and
other deeds evidently, to Defendant
Ruth Reyns. The deed conveying the
property to Defendant Ruth Reyns and
her sister Ellen Isom, now deceased,
was then recorded in the office of the
Weber County Recorder on 6 October
1983 at Book 1433, Page 1443, as
entry number 892145.

11.
Plaintiffs do not dispute the
allegations of paragraph 11 of
Defendants' Statement of Fact, but
emphasize that Defendants therein
admit that Reyns took possession of
the Quitclaim Deed meant for Shirlie
Charlesworth by their admission that
Commercial Security Bank released
the "warranty deed and other deeds
evidently, to Defendant Ruth Reyns."
(Defs.' Statement of Facts % 11
(emphasis added).)

Undisputed.

12.
Plaintiff Ruth C. Reyns
conveyed her two-thirds interest in the
property, arising under the deed
recorded in 1982, to her family trust
by way of a warranty deed dated 27
August 1985, and recorded said deed

12.
Undisputed, except to the
extent Defendants claim that Reyns
owned a two-thirds interest in the
property, which issue is the subject of
the parties' respective motions herein.

Undisputed.
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Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in
Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 187-197)

Reynses' Statement of Fact in Mem.
Opp. Mot. Summ. J. and in Supp.
Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 339-346)
in the office of the Weber County
Recorder on 28 August 1985, at Book
1474, Page 807, as entry number
946014.

Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in
Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 372-82)

Reynses' Statement of Fact in Reply
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 483-84)

13.
Plaintiff Rennly Charlesworth
testified that even though he had an
understanding that he was to have an
accounting of the partnership every
year, which he never received, he was
"kind of always kept in the dark." His
specific testimony was as follows:
Q.
Could you describe for me,
Mr. Charlesworth, what specifically
you believe [the Defendants] those
individuals did to prevent you from
acting or to induce you not to exercise
your rights under those various
documents [including the partnership
agreement, purchase contract, and
trust agreement and contract
assignment]?

13.
Plaintiffs do not dispute that
Rennly Charlesworth testified as
quoted. Plaintiffs do dispute,
however, Defendants' characterization
of that testimony as reflecting Mr.
Charlesworth's understanding at the
time of Reyns's defalcations. Instead,
Mr. Charlesworth testified in the
present tense. His testimony reflected
his understanding at the time of his
deposition (he stated "My
understanding is . . ."), which
understanding he gained only as a
result of his discussions with counsel.
(Rennly Charlesworth Aff. \ 30
(emphasis added).)

Undisputed.

Mr. Berger: To the extent you are
calling for a legal conclusion, I will
object, but the witness can testify as to
his understanding.
The Witness: My understanding is
that technically [Defendant] Ruth
[Reyns] and [Defendant] Bill [Reyns]
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Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in
Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 187-197)

Reynses' Statement of Fact in Mem.
Opp. Mot. Summ. J. and in Supp.
Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 339-346)
or whoever was in charge was
supposed to actually, every year, give
us some kind of accounting of the
partnership which never happened. So
we were kind of always in the dark.
Also through the chain of events of
things that have happened in the last
eight or twelve months I believe that
Ruth Reyns picked up a quit claim
deed to my mother [1982] and it was
never delivered to any of us. We were
never aware of it. So I believe we
were kept in the dark and that is how
they tried to keep us from doing
anything."

Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in
Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 372-82)

Reynses' Statement of Fact in Reply
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 483-84)

14.
Over a course of time,
Plaintiffs had demanded an accounting
which they did not receive. Moreover,
they became suspicious about the
nature of the management of the
partnership because they were not
receiving what they considered to be
adequate or appropriate income from
the partnership. Plaintiff Rennly
Charlesworth testified as follows:
Q:
After the time you became 21
years old, Mr. Charlesworth, did you
ever request an accounting other than
in this lawsuit you filed from Ruell
Investment Co., or anyone associated

14.
Disputed. Defendants contend
that Plaintiffs did not receive the
accounting they allegedly demanded.
However, the very portion of Mr.
Charlesworth's deposition testimony
quoted by Defendants belies this
assertion. Mr. Charlesworth testified
that Plaintiffs did receive a response.
This point is elaborated in paragraphs
8-10 of Plaintiffs' Additional
Statement of Fact below. Plaintiffs
similarly contest Defendants' assertion
that Plaintiffs had become suspicious
of Defendants, as Plaintiffs explain in
paragraphs 8-21 of Plaintiffs'

Undisputed.
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Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in
Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 187-197)

Reynses' Statement of Fact in Mem.
Opp. Mot. Summ. J. and in Supp.
Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 339-346)
with it?
A.

I personally did not.

Q:
Do you now whether any of
your brothers or sisters did?
A:
I believe my sister GayLee
wrote a letter to them asking for an
accounting.
Q:
Do you know when that
would have been?
A:
I think it was 1988. I never
saw it though.
Q:
Do you know what prompted
that?
A:
Just the fact that we kept
getting something every year saying
the boiler broke, we don't have any
money, we can't rent them out or
needed a new roof or something like
that.
Q:
These things would have
caused the money that you were
receiving to be reduced?
A:
Reduced or nonexistent.
Q:
Do you now whether GayLee
got any response?
A:
The only response I can think
of was a very curt letter to all of us

Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in
Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 372-82)
Additional Statement of Fact below.

Reynses' Statement of Fact in Reply
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 483-84)

1 Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in
Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 187-197)

Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in
Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 372-82)

Reynses' Statement of Fact in Mem.
Opp. Mot. Summ. J. and in Supp.
Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 339-346)
that year saying that one of us had
questioned the integrity of Ruth and
Bill and they were, you could tell, a
little bit upset. That's really all I
recall, is a paragraph on a Christmas
card or something like that.

Reynses' Statement of Fact in Reply
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 483-84)

Q:
Do you recall receiving any
financial information?
A:
No. They never - the only
financial information we ever received
were the K-l forms.
15.

15.
Plaintiffs commenced the
above-entitled action by filing a
complaint in the Third Judicial District
Court for Salt Lake County on 29 June
1997. Venue was erroneous in Salt
Lake and the case was subsequently
transferred to Weber County and filed
under its present case name and
number.

Undisputed.

Plaintiffs Additional Statement of Fact
1.
Reyns served as the managing
partner of the Partnership. In that
capacity, she paid annual distributions
of profits to each of the partners in the
Partnership, including Plaintiffs.
Reyns began making these annual
distributions no later than 1964.
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1.

Undisputed.

Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in
Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 187-197)

Reynses' Statement of Fact in Mem.
Opp. Mot. Summ. J. and in Supp.
Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 339-346)

Charlesworths5 Statement of Fact in
Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 372-82)
(Plaintiffs' Affs. 1} 6.)

Reynses' Statement of Fact in Reply
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 483-84)

2.
Plaintiffs understood that their
partnership interest was held for them
in trust prior to the time they became
21 years of age. During that time,
Reyns annually forwarded
distributions to be held in trust for
them. (Id 11 7.)

2.

Undisputed.

3.
At or around the time each of
the Plaintiffs became 21 years of age,
Reyns began to deliver the annual
partnership distributions directly to

3.

Undisputed.

4.
Also at or around the time
Plaintiffs became 21, Reyns began to
deliver Schedule K-ls directly to
them. These forms expressly stated
that Plaintiffs were partners in the
Partnership. (IcL1|9.)

4.

Undisputed.

5.
The annual partnership
distributions continued through at least
around 1985, which is over ten years
after the youngest of the Plaintiffs
turned 21. It is also very likely that
Reyns made one or two small cash
distributions to Plaintiffs after that
date. (Id 11 10.)

5.

Undisputed.

them. (Id 11 8.)

1?

1 Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in
Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 187-197)

Reynses' Statement of Fact in Mem.
Opp. Mot. Summ. J. and in Supp.
Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 339-346)

Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in
Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 372-82)
6.
After the annual cash
distributions ceased, Reyns continued
sending the Plaintiffs Schedule K-ls.
These forms continued to expressly
state that the Plaintiffs were partners
in the Partnership. The forms also
reflected each of the Plaintiffs' share
of Partnership distributions for the
year. In some years, the forms
reflected income to the Plaintiffs. In
other years, they reflected a loss.
Such income or loss was applied to the
Plaintiffs' Partnership capital account
balance reported on the Schedule K-l.
QcLltll.)

Reynses' Statement of Fact in Reply
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 483-84)
6.

Undisputed.

7.
Isom passed away in 1988.
The Plaintiffs understood that certain
of her family members, including
Raymond E. Isom, Patrick Isom, and
Colleen Ruth Isom Findley, inherited
or otherwise took control over Isom's
one-third interest in the Partnership,
and the Partnership continued. From
that time forward, the Plaintiffs'
understood that Reyns distributed onethird of partnership income and losses
to these members of Isom's family.
QLH12.)

7.

Undisputed.

8.

8.

Undisputed.
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In or around the fall of 1988,

Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in
Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 187-197)

Reynses' Statement of Fact in Mem.
Opp. Mot. Summ. J. and in Supp.
Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 339-346)

Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in
Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 372-82)
the Plaintiffs observed that their cash
distributions had ceased. Accordingly,
Plaintiff GayLee McEwan, know
known as GayLee Drezin, wrote a
letter to Reyns seeking an explanation.

Reynses' Statement of Fact in Reply
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 483-84)

(14113.)

Id

9.
In response, the Plaintiffs
received a letter from Reyns's
husband, Defendant Arie William
Reyns. The letter was dated
December 9, 1988. A copy of the
letter is attached to Plaintiffs'
Affidavits as Exhibit A. As expressed
in the December 9 letter, Reyns
apparently took offense at the contents
of GayLee's letter. Nevertheless,
Reyns's letter contained a fair amount
of detail. It explained that property
taxes and maintenance costs had been
rising. It also stated that, in light of
federal low-income housing being
built in the area, Reyns had to lower
the rent for the Property. Finally, the
letter disclosed to the Plaintiffs that
Reyns was attempting to sell the
Property, but had not received any
serious offers. (Id. 1 14.)

9.

Undisputed.

10.
The explanation in the letter
seemed reasonable and adequate to the

10.

Undisputed.

1 Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in
Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 187-197)

Reynses' Statement of Fact in Mem.
Opp. Mot. Summ. J. and in Supp.
Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 339-346)

Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in
Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 372-82)
Plaintiffs. Therefore, they did not
inquire of Reyns any further
concerning the matter. (Id U 15.)
11.
Subsequently, the Plaintiffs
received another letter from Reyns's
husband concerning the Property.
This letter was dated December 10,
1989. A copy of this letter is attached
to Plaintiffs' Affidavits as Exhibit B.
This letter similarly stated that the
Partnership had incurred significant
maintenance costs, and that the
Property was experiencing a very high
vacancy rate. The letter also noted
that the Property was still for sale, but
that no one had made any offers to
purchase it. (Id. ^j 16.)

Reynses' Statement of Fact in Reply
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 483-84)

11.

Undisputed.

12.
The December 10 letter also
confirmed the Plaintiffs'
understanding that the Partnership
continued after Isom's death. For
example, the letter indicated that the
Property was still being maintained
and rented. The letter also indicated
that the Partnership had taken out a
loan that would be payable over the
following four years. It also
specifically noted: "The law here
required us to have the property
appraised after [Isom's] death for

12.

Undisputed.
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Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in
Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 187-197)

Reynses' Statement of Fact in Mem.
Opp. Mot. Summ. J. and in Supp.
Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 339-346)

1 *

Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in
Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 372-82)
probate. This cost is $600.00, and is
paid for, however it is an expense that
has to be shared." (Plaintiffs'
Affidavits, Ex. B.) Thus, it indicated
that the Plaintiffs would continue to
share in the costs borne by the
Partnership. (Id.1Jl7.)

Reynses' Statement of Fact in Reply
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 483-84)

13.
The Plaintiffs also recall
receiving, from time to time,
additional letters or notes from Reyns
or her husband explaining the amount
of their Partnership distributions.
These communications often indicated
that the distributions were small in
light of the cost of maintaining the
Property. ( I d ^ 18.)

13.

Undisputed.

14.
During this time, and
thereafter, the Plaintiffs continued to
receive Schedule K-ls from Reyns.
The K-ls expressly recited that they
were partners in the Partnership. They
also reflected income and losses added
to or subtracted from their Partnership
capital accounts. (Id, 11 19.)

14.

Undisputed.

15.
Reyns sent the Schedule K-1 s
for each tax year through and
including 1992. The Schedule K-l for
the tax year 1992 was sent to Plaintiffs

15.

Undisputed.

1 Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in
Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 187-197)

Reynses' Statement of Fact in Mem.
Opp. Mot. Summ. J. and in Supp.
Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 339-346)

Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in
Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 372-82)
in 1993. (Id H 20.)

Reynses' Statement of Fact in Reply
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 483-84)

16.
As of September of 1994,
Plaintiffs had not received the
Schedule K-l for the 1993 tax year.
At that time, Plaintiff Rennly
Charlesworth phoned Reyns and
inquired as to when the Plaintiffs
would be receiving their Schedule Kls. (KLH21.)

16.

Undisputed.

17.
During that telephone
conversation, Reyns informed Mr.
Charlesworth that the Partnership was
"over." (Id 1| 22.)

17.

Undisputed.

18.
Prior to that time, neither
Reyns nor anyone else had never
indicated to Plaintiffs in any manner,
either outright or by implication, nor
did the Plaintiffs otherwise know or
suspect, or have reason to know or
suspect, that she or anyone else
considered the Partnership "over," or
that she was terminating, attempting to
terminate, or had terminated the
Partnership or their interest in the
Partnership. To the contrary, she had
indicated that the Plaintiffs were
partners in the Partnership by sending
them Schedule K-ls that reflected

18.

Undisputed.
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Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in
Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 187-197)

Reynses' Statement of Fact in Mem.
Opp. Mot. Summ. J. and in Supp.
Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 339-346)

Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in
Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 372-82)
their partnership status. (Id. ^ 23.)

Reynses' Statement of Fact in Reply
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 483-84)

19.
Subsequently, in the summer
of 1997, and only after Mr.
Charlesworth contacted a lawyer, the
Plaintiffs learned that Reyns had sold
the Property. The Plaintiffs also
learned that Reyns kept two-thirds of
the proceeds from this sale, and that
she distributed the remaining one-third
of the proceeds from the sale to the
Isom family. (ML T[ 24.)

19.

Undisputed.

20.
Prior to discovering that
Reyns had sold the Property, neither
Reyns nor anyone else had ever
indicated to the Plaintiffs in any
manner, either outright or by
implication, nor did the Plaintiffs
otherwise know or suspect, nor have
reason to know or suspect, that the
Property had been sold, that the
owners of the Property had changed in
any manner, that Reyns or anyone else
owned or claimed to own the Property
separate and apart from the
Partnership, that Reyns had executed
and recorded deeds concerning the
Property, or that she or anyone else
claimed that the Plaintiffs no longer
had an ownership interest in the

20.

Undisputed.

18

1 Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in
Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 187-197)

Reynses' Statement of Fact in Mem.
Opp. Mot. Summ. J. and in Supp.
Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 339-346)

Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in
Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 372-82)
Property. (Id 11 25.)

Reynses' Statement of Fact in Reply
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 483-84)

21.
Among other things, in light
of the fact that Reyns is the Plaintiffs'
aunt, in light of the fact that they
therefore trusted her integrity
implicitly, m light of the explanations
they received concerning the amount
of the Partnership distnbutions, in
light of the fact that they had received
annual distributions (either outright or
as stated in a Schedule K-1) for over
two decades, and m light of the
Schedule K-ls that they received each
year from Reyns that expressly recited
their partnership status and their share
of Partnership profits and losses, the
Plaintiffs never knew or suspected, nor
did they have reason to know or
suspect, that Reyns considered the
Partnership to be "over." For these
same reasons, the Plaintiffs never
suspected, nor did they have reason to
suspect, that Reyns had executed and
recorded conveyances concerning the
Property, or that she had sold the
Property and distributed the proceeds
of the sale. Similarly, in light of the
fact that Reyns apprised Plaintiffs of
her efforts to sell the Property,
Plaintiffs presumed she would apprise

21.

39

Undisputed.

Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in
Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 187-197)

Reynses' Statement of Fact in Mem.
Opp. Mot. Summ. J. and in Supp.
Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 339-346)

Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in
Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 372-82)
them if in fact she found a buyer. (Id.
126.)

Reynses' Statement of Fact in Reply
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 483-84)

22.
Once they learned of these
events, and after struggling with the
issue of whether to bring legal action
against a family member, but feeling
they had no alternative, the Plaintiffs
brought this action. (IdL 1f 27.)

22.

Undisputed.

23.
Except as described below,
none of the Plaintiffs was ever shown,
nor were they privy to, any of the
documents or deeds governing or
related to the creation of the
Partnership, the purchase of the
Property, or the Trust Agreement
concerning the same. Similarly, they
were never apprised when the
Partnership's Contract to purchase the
Property had been satisfied. In
reviewing his father's papers in or
around 1985 to 1988 after his father
had passed away, which was a very
emotional time for him, Rennly
Charlesworth came across an apparent
draft of what he now believes was the
Partnership Agreement. It was on
onion skin paper and was almost
illegible, and it was also unsigned. He
therefore did not, and could not for the

23.

Undisputed.
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Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in
Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 187-197)

Reynses' Statement of Fact in Mem.
Opp. Mot. Summ. J. and in Supp.
Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 339-346)

Charlesworths' Statement of Fact in
Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.
and in Opp. to Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 372-82)
most part, review its terms. (Id. If 28.)

Reynses' Statement of Fact in Reply
Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J.
(R. at 483-84)

24.
To this date, none of the
Plaintiffs have received any of the
proceeds from the sale of the Property.

24.

011129.)
792295v4
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Undisputed.
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Court of Appeals of Michigan.
Charles MICHAEL, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Kenneth PELLAND and Winifred Pelland,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 229876.
Sept. 20, 2002.

Before: SMOLENSKI, P.J., and TALBOT and
WILDER, JJ.
UNPUBLISHED
PER CURIAM.
*1 In this partnership case, plaintiff appeals as of
right from the circuit court's order granting
summary disposition in favor of defendants. The
circuit court ruled that plaintiffs claims were
time-barred. We affirm.
This Court reviews a trial court's decision to grant a
motion for summary disposition under MCR
2.116(C)(7) de novo to determine if the moving
party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Rheaume v. Vandenberg, 232 Mich.App 417,
420-421; 591 NW2d 331 (1998). When reviewing a
motion under this rule, this Court considers all
affidavits, pleadings and other documentary
evidence submitted by the parties and, where
applicable, construes the pleadings in favor of the
nonmoving party. Id. at 421. Absent a disputed
issue of fact, whether a cause of action is barred by
a statute of limitations is a question of law that this
Court reviews de novo. Colbert v. Conybeare Law
Office, 239 Mich.App 608, 613-614; 609 NW2d

208 (2000). Further, this Court reviews the
interpretation of statutes de novo as a question of
law. Id. at 614.
In August 1978, plaintiff and defendant Kenneth
Pelland formed a Michigan partnership called
"Pelland & Michael," for the purpose of "acquiring,
owning, developing and selling for a profit a vacant
parcel of property" located on Cogswell Road in the
city of Wayne. In September 1978, the partnership
acquired the property for $40,650. The partnership
paid a cash down payment of $7,000, made a
prepayment of principal in the amount of $4,788,
and financed the remaining balance on land
contract. The partnership paid these sums from
capital contributed by both plaintiff and Kenneth
Pelland.
Through the middle of 1980, both plaintiff and
Kenneth Pelland contributed equal amounts of
capital into the partnership, in order to make the
regular land contract payments, pay the property
taxes, and cover other professional fees. At that
time, the relationship between the partners broke
down. In an effort to dissolve the partnership,
plaintiff offered to either purchase Kenneth
Pelland's interest in the partnership or sell his
interest in the partnership to Kenneth Pelland.
When the partners could not negotiate a purchase or
a sale of partnership interest, plaintiff stopped
contributing capital to the partnership. After July
1980, Kenneth Pelland made all of the land contract
installment payments and paid all the property taxes.
In December 1983, Kenneth Pelland executed a
land contract assignment that conveyed the
partnership's interest in the property to himself and
his wife, Winifred Pelland. Although plaintiff did
not consent to the conveyance, letters exchanged
between the parties' counsel at that time
demonstrate that plaintiff was aware of the
conveyance. In October 1984, the land contract
vendors, Joseph L. Hayden and Lucille M. Hayden,
conveyed the property to defendants by warranty
deed. Defendants remained the owners of the
property until they sold it in 1995 to Ford Motor
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Company. The instant action followed.
*2 The circuit court granted summary disposition
to defendants, ruling that plaintiffs claims were
time-barred. On appeal, the pivotal issue is when
the applicable statute of limitations began to run.
Plaintiff argues that his claims arose in 1995;
defendants counter that plaintiffs claims arose in
1983. We conclude that defendants' argument is
correct. Plaintiffs claims arose in 1983, and are
therefore time-barred.
As an initial matter, M.C.L. § 600.5827 provides
that a claim accrues when the wrong is done,
without regard to when the damage results. The
term "wrong," as used in the accrual provision,
refers to the date on which the plaintiff was harmed
by the defendant's act, not the date on which the
defendant acted. Stephens v. Dixon, 449 Mich. 531,
534-535; 536 NW2d 755 (1995). Two statutes of
limitation are potentially applicable here. Pursuant
to M.C.L. § 600.5807(8), a wronged party has six
years to bring suit to recover damages or sums due
for a breach of contract. That six-year period begins
to run on the date the contract was breached. Dewey
v. Tabor, 226 Mich.App 189, 193; 572 NW2d 715
(1997). Further, the six-year "catchall" statute of
limitations contained in M.C.L. § 600.5813 applies
when the right to recovery arises from a statute.
National Sand, Inc v. Nagel Construction, Inc, 182
Mich.App 327, 337 n 7; 451 NW2d 618 (1990).
Regardless of which limitation period applies here,
we conclude that plaintiffs suit is time-barred.
In December 1983, Kenneth Pelland executed a
land contract assignment that conveyed the
partnership's interest in the partnership property to
himself and his wife. MCL 449.10(1) states the
following regarding the conveyance of a
partnership's real property:
Where title to real property is in the partnership
name, any partner may convey a title to such
property by a conveyance executed in the
partnership name; but the partnership may
recover such property unless the partner's act
binds the partnership under the provisions of
paragraph [1] of section 9, [FN1] or unless such
property has been conveyed by the grantee or a
person claiming through such grantee to a holder
for value without knowledge that the partner, in
making the conveyance, has exceeded his
Copr. © 2004 West. No Claim
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authority.
FN1. MCL 449.9.
Further, M.C.L. § 449.9(1) states:
Every partner is an agent of the partnership for
the purpose of its business, and the act of every
partner, including the execution in the partnership
name of any instrument, for apparently carrying
on in the usual way the business of the
partnership of which he is a member binds the
partnership, unless the partner so acting has in
fact no authority to act for the partnership in the
particular matter, and the person with whom he is
dealing has knowledge of the fact that he has no
such authority.
Finally, M.C.L. § 449.9(2) states:
An act of a partner which is not apparently for the
carrying on of the business of the partnership in
the usual way does not bind the partnership unless
authorized by the other partners.
*3 The evidence indicates that Kenneth Pelland
was not carrying on partnership business in the
usual manner, he was not authorized by plaintiff to
make the conveyance, and defendants were not
bona fide purchasers. MCL 449.9(1); MCL 449.9(2)
; MCL 449.10(1). Thus, Kenneth Pelland lacked
authority to convey the property to himself and his
wife. According to the language of M.C.L. §
449.10(1), the partnership therefore had a claim to
"recover" the property. Backowski v. Solecki, 112
MicLApp 401, 406-408; 316 NW2d 434 (1982).
The applicable statutes do not say that the
conveyance is "void" and that the real property
remains in the partnership, as plaintiff claims.
Instead, the unauthorized conveyance gave plaintiff
a right to file a circuit court action on behalf of the
partnership, in order to "recover" the property.
MCL 449.10(1). In fact, a letter from 1983, drafted
and sent by plaintiffs then counsel, admitted
knowledge of the conveyance as well as the
applicable rule of law:
It is our position that Mr. Pelland's conveyance of
the partnership's interest in the land contract was
made without authority and is therefore voidable.
It is our intention, if necessary, to commence an
action in the name of the partnership against Mr.
Pelland for recovery of the property.
This correspondence illustrates that plaintiff was
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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aware of the conveyance and his cause of action
under M.C.L. §449.10(1).
A claim accrues when the wrong is done. MCL
600.5827. Because Kenneth Pelland did not have
authority to convey the property to himself and his
wife in 1983, and because plaintiff was aware of the
conveyance and his cause of action under M.C.L. §
449.10(1), plaintiffs claim clearly accrued in 1983.
Plaintiff had six years to bring suit under a breach
of partnership contract theory pursuant to M.C.L. §
600.5807(8), or six years under M.C.L. § 600.5813
under a theory arising from a statute, namely the
applicable portions of the Uniform Partnership Act.
M.C.L. § 449.1 et seq. Therefore, plaintiffs suit
became time-barred in 1989. MCL 600.5807(8);
MCL 600.5813.
Plaintiff claims that the statute of limitations did
not begin to run until defendants conveyed the
property to Ford in 1995. Plaintiffs argument is
based on his theory that the real property in
question remained in the partnership until that
point. We disagree. Under M.C.L. § 449.10(1),
"any partner may convey a title to such [real]
property by a conveyance executed in the
partnership name." Although Kenneth Pelland
wrongly transferred the property to himself and his
wife, under M.C.L. § 449.10(1), title to the
partnership property was transferred out of the
partnership and the transfer was not void. The plain
language of the statute explains that in these
circumstances, after the transfer, the partnership
"may recover" the property. Despite threatening to
file suit to recover the property, plaintiff never did
so. Contrary to plaintiffs assertion, the property is
no longer recoverable. MCL 449.10(1); MCL
600.5807(8); MCL 600.5813. Despite the fact that
the sale of the property in 1995 allows plaintiff to
more easily estimate his monetary damages, it is
"the fact of identifiable and appreciable loss, and
not the finality of monetary damages, that gives
birth to the cause of action." Luick v. Rademacher,
129 Mich.App 803, 806; 342 NW2d 617 (1983).
*4 Relying on M.C.L. § 449.30, plaintiff also
argues that his action for an accounting cannot
begin to run until after the dissolution and winding
up of the partnership. The statute provides: "[o]n
dissolution the partnership is not terminated, but
continues until the winding up of partnership affairs
Copr. © 2004 West. No Claim
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is completed." MCL 449.30. Plaintiff claims that
the partnership was never dissolved and that there
was no winding up period. Therefore, plaintiff
argues that the statute of limitations has not yet
begun to run. We disagree.
MCL 449.43 provides that the right to an
accounting accrues at the date of dissolution of the
partnership:
The right, to an account of his interest shall
accrue to any partner, or his legal representative,
as against the winding up partners or the
surviving partners or the person or partnership
continuing the business, at the date of dissolution,
in the absence of any agreement to the contrary.
Further, M.C.L. § 449.29 describes the meaning of
the term "dissolution":
The dissolution of a partnership is the change in
the relation of the partners caused by any partner
ceasing to be associated in the carrying on as
distinguished from the winding up of the business.
Here, the evidence indicates a definite "change in
the relation of the partners" in 1983, when Kenneth
Pelland transferred the real property out of the
partnership, to himself and his wife. MCL 449.29.
Although Kenneth Pelland's act was wrongful, title
to the only partnership asset was transferred out of
the partnership. MCL 449.10(1). The law is well
settled that when a partnership no longer holds
assets or ceases to do the business for which it was
organized, a partnership is dissolved. Schwier v.
Hurlburt, 184 Mich. 698, 702; 151 NW 603 (1915);
Potter v. Tolbert, 113 Mich. 486, 489; 71 NW 849
(1897). Because Kenneth Pelland made an
affirmative act to remove himself from a
two-partner partnership, because the partnership no
longer had any assets, and because plaintiff had
stopped contributing capital to the partnership
despite the terms of the partnership agreement, the
evidence
overwhelmingly
shows
that
the
partnership was "dissolved" in 1983.
Moreover, in a suit for dissolution and an
accounting of an alleged partnership, our Supreme
Court held that a claim for undistributed profits
which the plaintiff failed to assert for six years from
the time the partnership stopped doing business was
presented too late. Swiatkowski v. Kroll, 331 Mich.
179, 183; 49 NW2d 128 (1951). This instant case is
similar, although over sixteen years passed from the
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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time when the pairtnership could be considered
"dissolved." Hence, like Swiatkowski, this matter
was presented too late, and plaintiffs argument that
the partnership is still intact, and that this suit can
still be instituted, is incorrect. Id.
Plaintiff also argues that this Court should interpret
his claims as mixed questions of law and fact, and
should allow further factual development in the
circuit court. However, because plaintiffs suit
became time-barred in 1989, further factual
development would be futile. Our Supreme Court
discussed the policies underlying the statute of
limitations, as follows:
*5 Statutes of limitations are intended to "compel
the exercise of a right of action within a
reasonable time so that the opposing party has a
fair opportunity to defend"; "to relieve a court
system from dealing with 'stale' claims, where the
facts in dispute occurred so long ago that
evidence was either forgotten or manufactured";
and to protect "potential defendants from
protracted fear of litigation." [Moll v. Abbott
Laboratories, 444 Mich. 1, 14; 506 NW2d 816
(1993), quoting Bigelow v. Walraven, 392 Mich.
566, 576; 221 NW2d 328 (1974).]
The limitations period here expired in 1989, over
ten years before plaintiff filed his complaint. This is
an example of the type of stale claim that statutes of
limitation were meant to prevent. Plaintiffs claims
are time-barred and summary disposition was
appropriate. Moll, supra at 14; Bigelow, supra at
576.
Affirmed.
END OF DOCUMENT
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Background: Excavation subcontractor brought
action against general contractor for public
university's construction project, asserting claims
for breach of contract, quantum meruit, and breach
of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Subcontractor later amended complaint to add claim
against surety that issued payment bond. The Third
District, Salt Lake Department, William B. Bohling,
J., granted subcontractor's motion for summary
judgment as to claims against general contractor
and granted surety's motion for summary judgment.
General contractor and subcontractor appealed, and
appeals were consolidated.
Holdings: The Supreme Court, Billings, P.J., held
that:
(1) general contractor's failure to comply with
Judicial Administration Rule governing opposition
to motion for summary judgment did not warrant
admitting all material facts set forth in
subcontractor's statement;
(2) contract implied in fact existed;
(3) testimony by general contractor's vice
president amounted to inadmissible hearsay;
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(4) subsequent mutual agreement between general
contractor and excavation subcontractor did not
constitute parol evidence;
(5) discovery rule did not apply regarding claim
against surety; and
(6) amended complaint would relate back to
original complaint if surety had constructive or
actual notice during limitations period that it would
have been a proper party to original complaint.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
[1] Appeal and Error €=>842(2)
30k842(2) Most Cited Cases
[1] Appeal and Error €=>934(1)
30k934(l) Most Cited Cases
When reviewing a grant of summary judgment,
Supreme Court views all facts and reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party and reviews the
trial court's conclusions of law for correctness.
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 56(c).
[2] Motions 0=>\
267k 1 Most Cited Cases
Trial court has discretion in requiring compliance
with Judicial Administration Rule setting forth
uniform procedures for motions and supporting
memoranda. Judicial Administration Rule 4-501
(Repealed).
[3] Costs €=^194.18
102k 194.18 Most Cited Cases
Calculation of reasonable attorney fees is in the
sound discretion of the trial court.
[4] Appeal and Error €=>984(5)
30k984(5) Most Cited Cases
Trial court's calculation of reasonable attorney fees
will not be overturned in the absence of a showing
of a clear abuse of discretion.
[5] Judgment €=>183
228kl83 Most Cited Cases
General contractor's failure to comply with Judicial
Administration Rule requiring party opposing
motion for summary judgment to set forth in
opposing memorandum movant's statement of facts
followed by concise statement of materials facts
which support contention that genuine issue of
materials facts exist did not warrant admitting all
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material facts set forth in subcontractor's statement
of undisputed facts in subcontractor's action that
was brought against general contractor for breach of
contract, quantum meruit, and breach of implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing; some of the
facts general contractor set forth in separate section
of memorandum had appropriate record citations,
and general contractor had asserted that those facts
created disputed factual issues. Rules Civ.Proc,
Rule 56(c); Judicial Administration Rule 4-501
(repealed).
[6] Contracts €=>27
95k27 Most Cited Cases
Contract implied in fact existed between general
contractor and excavation subcontractor whereby
subcontractor would be provided compensation
beyond that stated in subcontract for work
performed that was not listed in subcontract;
general contractor requested that subcontractor
perform
work
not
listed
in
subcontract,
subcontractor expected additional compensation for
work performed that was not listed in subcontract,
and general contractor knew or should have known
that
subcontractor
expected
additional
compensation.
[7] Contracts €=>2 7
95k27 Most Cited Cases
To succeed on excavation subcontractor's claim
that was brought against general contractor and that
was based on contract implied in fact, subcontractor
was required to show that (1) general contractor
requested subcontractor to perform the work under
provision that were not included in accepted bid, (2)
subcontractor expected additional compensation
from general contractor for the work, and (3)
general contractor knew or should have known that
subcontractor expected additional compensation.
[8] Evidence €=>317(2)
157k317(2) Most Cited Cases
Testimony by general contractor's vice president
concerning
conversations
between
general
contractor's project manager and excavation
subcontractor amounted to inadmissible hearsay and
thus was not admissible in subcontractor's action
against general contractor for breach of contract
implied in fact.
[9] Evidence €=^445(7)
157k445(7) Most Cited Cases
Subsequent mutual agreement between general
contractor and excavation subcontractor to strike
section from subcontract after they discovered that
Copr. © 2004 West. No Claim
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section had been included in subcontract by mistake
did
not
constitute
"parol
evidence"
in
subcontractor's action for breach of contract implied
in fact; agreement was not a contemporaneous or
prior conversation, representation, or statement.
[10] Limitation of Actions €=>95(9)
241k95(9) Most Cited Cases
Discovery rule did not apply and thus did not toll
one-year
limitations period
for
excavation
subcontractor to bring action against surety that
issued payment bond to general contractor
regarding public university's construction project;
given its experience, subcontractor should have
known that payment bond was required for
construction
of
public
structures,
and
subcontractor's attempt to obtain copy of bond from
general contractor and university demonstrated that
it knew of bond when it was considering litigation.
West's U.C.A. §§ 63-56- 38(4), 63-56-39.
[Ill Limitation of Actions €^=>95(1)
241k95(l) Most Cited Cases
In certain circumstances, the discovery rule tolls
the statute of limitations period until facts forming
the basis for the cause of action are discovered.
[12] Limitation of Actions €=^95(1)
241k95(l) Most Cited Cases
Under the discovery rule, it is a threshold issue
whether the plaintiff knew or should have known
about its cause of action before the statute of
limitations ran.
[13] Appeal and Error €=>959(1)
30k959(l) Most Cited Cases
Abuse-of-discretion standard applies to trial court's
decision regarding whether to allow amendment of
pleadings. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 15(a).
[14] Appeal and Error €=*863
30k863 Most Cited Cases
Correctness standard of review applies to trial
court's decision on summary judgment regarding
whether amendment to pleadings relates back to
date of original filing for limitations purposes.
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 15(c).
[15] Limitation of Actions €=?124
241kl24 Most Cited Cases
Test for relation back of amended pleading for
limitations purposes includes whether (1) the
amended pleading alleged only claims that arose out
of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth
or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading
and (2) the added party had received actual or
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constructive notice that it would have been a proper
party to the original pleading such that no prejudice
would result from preventing the new party from
using a statute-of-limitations defense that otherwise
would have been available. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule
15(c).
[16] Limitation of Actions €=>121(2)
24lkl21(2) Most Cited Cases
Misnomer cases, in which party seeks to amend
pleadings to name correct opposing party, are
analyzed under procedural rule governing relation
back of pleadings for limitations purposes, and the
analysis focuses upon whether there was sufficient
notice to the real party of interest so that relation
back is not prejudicial. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 15(c).
[17] Limitation of Actions €=>124
24lkl24 Most Cited Cases
Where a new party had sufficient notice that it
would have been a proper party to the original
pleading, the purpose of the statute of limitations is
not defeated by applying the relation-back doctrine
to deprive the new party of its statute-of-limitations
defense. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 15(c).
[18] Limitation of Actions €=^124
24lkl24 Most Cited Cases
Excavation subcontractor's amended complaint,
which would have added as a defendant surety that
issued payment bond on public university's
construction project, would relate back to original
complaint against general contractor if surety had
constructive or actual notice during limitations
period that it would have been a proper party to
original complaint. West's U.C.A. § 63-56- 38(4);
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 15(c).
[19] Limitation of Actions €=>124
24lkl24 Most Cited Cases
Notice transfer test, under which party named in
original pleading and party to be named in amended
pleading are to closely related in their business
operations that notice of action against one serves to
provide notice to the other for purposes of relation
back for limitations purposes, is not satisfied by
general contractor-surety relationship alone. Rules
Civ.Proc, Rule 15(c).
[20] Limitation of Actions €=^124
241kl24 Most Cited Cases
Whether party named in original pleading and
party to be named in amended pleading shared
counsel prior to running of limitations period could
be relevant to imputing notice to party to be named
in amended pleading for purposes of whether
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amended pleading would relate back to date that
original pleading was filed. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule
15(c).
Jeffery R. Price and Michael E. Bostwick, Salt
Lake City, for Appellants.
Brian W. Steffensen, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
OPINION
BILLINGS, Presiding Judge:
*1 f 1 Fox Construction, Inc. (Fox) appeals from
a trial court order granting summary judgment to
Gary Porter Construction Porter. We affirm. Porter
appeals from a trial court order granting summary
judgment and awarding attorney fees to National
Surety Corporation National. We reverse in part
and remand. The appeals have been consolidated.

BACKGROUND
U 2 The University of Utah the University
contracted with Fox for the construction of a
Women's Gymnastics Training Facility the Facility
on the University campus. As required by Utah
Code section 63-56-38 and its contract with the
University, Fox and its surety, National, issued a
payment bond the Bond for the benefit of persons
supplying labor and material for construction of the
Facility. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-56-38 (1997).
H 3 Fox entered into a subcontract with Porter
whereby Porter was to perform various excavation
and soil placement services. Specifically, the
subcontract required Porter to "furnish and install
all materials, equipment and labor per plans,
specification sections 02000, 02070, 02230, 02601,
02680, 02700 and 02721 and addendums 1 and 2"
Included Sections for the sum of $146,740.00.
Subsequently, Fox and Porter mutually agreed that
section 02680 had been included by mistake, and as
a result, Porter did no work specified in that section.
After work on the Facility had begun, Fox also
asked Porter to perform additional work under
sections 02300, 02665, and 02711 Excluded
Sections, none of which were included in the
subcontract or the bid.
U 4 When Porter invoiced Fox for its work, it
identified the specific work done, the costs of the
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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work by line item, and the particular section under
which the work had been performed. At times, Fox
verbally acknowledged that Porter was performing
work outside the subcontract. Until sometime in
early 1998, Fox paid for all work done by Porter,
whether it fell under Excluded Sections or Included
Sections. Thereafter, numerous disputes over
payments arose between Fox and Porter. In short,
Porter claimed that Fox owed it payments in
addition to the $146,740.00 for work it had done
under the Excluded Sections, and Fox claimed that
because these sections had been mistakenly
excluded from the subcontract when Fox had
drafted it, Fox owed Porter no additional amounts.
The last day Porter worked on the Facility was May
16, 1999.
% 5 Sometime in early spring of 1999, Porter
verbally requested information on the Bond from
Fox because it planned to file a lawsuit. On April
23, 1999, Porter sent a letter to the University
requesting information on the Bond. The University
forwarded the letter to Fox, but neither Fox nor the
University provided Porter information on the
Bond. In May 1999, Porter again verbally requested
information on the Bond from Fox. Fox again did
not provide the information to Porter.
f 6 Porter filed its complaint against Fox on
March 16, 2000, alleging breach of contract,
quantum meruit, and breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. Porter did not make a claim
upon the Bond at this time. In late June 2000, Fox
provided Porter a copy of the Bond pursuant to a
discovery request. Approximately six months later
on January 12, 2001, Porter filed a motion to amend
its complaint, which was unopposed and ultimately
granted. On March 14, 2001, Porter filed its
amended complaint naming National as a party and
making a claim upon the Bond.
*2 K 7 Porter moved for summary judgment on its
claims against Fox. The trial court granted Porter's
motion. Fox appeals.
U 8 National moved for summary judgment
against Porter based upon its affirmative defense
that the statute of limitations barred Porter's claim
upon the Bond. The trial court granted National's
motion after it concluded that (1) Porter had no
legal justification for failing to name National and
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make a claim upon the Bond in its original
complaint against Fox, which would have been
timely; and (2) no identity of interest existed
between National and Fox, and thus Porter's
amended complaint did not relate back to its
original complaint against Fox as required under
rule 15(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The
trial court then awarded attorney fees to National.
Porter appeals.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
U 9 First, Fox argues that the trial court erred by
granting summary judgment to Porter after
concluding that Fox had failed (1) to comply with
rule 4- 501(2)(B) of the Utah Rules of Judicial
Administration [FN1] or (2) to create a material
dispute with its additional facts. Second, Porter
argues that the trial court erred by granting
summary judgment to National after concluding that
Porter's claims against National were barred by the
applicable statute of limitations.
[1][2] % 10 Motions for summary judgment should
be granted when "there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c).
When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we
view all facts and reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party and review the trial court's
conclusions of law for correctness. See Lovendahl
v. Jordan Sch. Dist, 2002 UT 130,H 13, 63 P.3d
705. However, "the trial court has discretion in
requiring compliance with rule 4-501 [of the Utah
Rules of Judicial Administration]." Fennell v.
Green, 2003 UT App 291.H 9, 77 P.3d 339.
[3][4] H 11 Porter also challenges the trial court's
calculation of attorney fees awarded to National.
"Calculation of reasonable attorney fees is in the
sound discretion of the trial court, and will not be
overturned in the absence of a showing of a clear
abuse of discretion." Dixie State Bank v. Bracken,
764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988) (citation omitted).
ANALYSIS
I. Fox's Appeal
K 12 The trial court granted Porter's motion for
summary judgment on two separate grounds. First,
the trial court ruled that Fox had failed to comply
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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with rule 4-501(2)(B) of the Utah Rules of Judicial
Administration. Second, the trial court concluded
that Fox had not created a material dispute with the
additional facts it had submitted. We address each
ground.
A.Rule4-501(2)(B)
[5] U 13 When summary judgment papers were
filed in this case, rule 4- 501(2)(B) read as follows:
The points and authorities in opposition to a
motion for summary judgment shall begin with a
section that contains a verbatim restatement of
each of the movant's statement of facts as to
which the party contends a genuine issue exists
followed by a concise statement of material facts
which support the party's contention. Each
disputed fact shall be stated in separate numbered
sentences and shall specifically refer to those
portions of the record upon which the opposing
party relies. All material facts set forth in the
movant's statement and properly supported by an
accurate reference to the record shall be deemed
admitted for the purpose of summary judgment
unless specifically controverted by the opposing
party's statement.
*3 Utah R. Jud. Admin. 4-501(2)(B) (2002).
Because Fox did not "begin with a section that
contains a verbatim restatement of each of [Porter's]
statement of facts ... followed by a concise
statement of material facts which support [Fox's]
contention [that a genuine issue of facts exists]," the
trial court concluded that Fox had failed to comply
with rule 4-501; for this reason, the trial court
admitted "[a] 11 the material facts set forth in
[Porter's] statement" of undisputed facts. Id. Based
upon this admission, the trial court ruled that there
were no disputed issues of fact and that Fox was
thereby entitled to summary judgment.
U 14 Two cases decided after the trial court's
ruling support the trial court's conclusion that it had
discretion to admit facts not
"specifically
controverted" in the manner outlined in rule
4-501(2)(B). In Lovendahl v. Jordan Sch. District,
2002 UT 130, 63 P.3d 705, the Utah Supreme
Court ruled that the trial court had properly
admitted the moving party's facts because these
facts were not " 'specifically controverted by the
opposing party's statement.' " Id. at f 50 (quoting
Utah R. Jud. Admin. 4-501(2)(B) (2002)).
Copr. © 2004 West. No Claim
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Similarly, in Fennell v. Green, 2003 UT App 291,
77 P.3d 339, this court held that the trial court had
not "abused its discretion in requiring compliance
with rule 4-501 and thus ruling that the facts, as
stated in [the moving party's] motions and
supporting memoranda, were deemed admitted." Id.
at % 9. Specifically, it was not an abuse of
discretion for the trial court to admit all of the
moving party's facts when the nonmoving party's
opposition papers did "not refer to [the moving
party's] statements of uncontroverted facts, but
instead included only [its] own statement of
undisputed facts ... [leaving] it unclear what facts ...
were disputed." Id. at ^ 7.
T| 15 Both Lovendahl and Fennell support the
conclusion that the trial court in this case did not
abuse its discretion in enforcing rule 4-501(2)(B) by
admitting Porter's facts as undisputed when Fox
failed to comply with the rule. However, the Utah
Supreme Court has since interpreted rule
4-501(2)(B), without mentioning these prior cases,
in a somewhat more relaxed way. See Salt Lake
County v. Metro W. Ready Mix, Inc., 2004 UT 23,K
23 n. 4, 89 P.3d 155. As the Court explained in
Metro West, even where an
opposing memorandum [does} not set forth
disputed facts listed in numbered sentences in a
separate section as required [by the rule, as long
as] the disputed facts [are] clearly provided in the
body of the memorandum with applicable record
references, ... failure to comply with the technical
requirements of rule 4-501(2)(B) [is] harmless.
Id. [FN2] Because some of the facts Fox set forth
in a separate section had appropriate record
citations, which Fox asserts create disputed issues
of material fact, under Metro West the trial court
abused its discretion to enforce rule 4-501(2)(B)
when it admitted Porter's undisputed facts because
Fox failed to comply with rule 4-501. Thus, we
must examine whether Fox's additional "facts are
sufficient to preclude summary judgment in favor of
[Porter]." Id.
B. Fox's Additional Facts
*4 [6] H 16 The trial court also concluded that the
additional facts submitted by Fox do not create a
material dispute. We agree.
[7] K 17 Porter argues that Fox owes additional
compensation for work it did under the Excluded
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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Sections based upon a contract implied in fact.
[FN3] To succeed on this claim, Porter must show
that (1) Fox requested Porter to perform the work
under the Excluded Sections, (2) Porter expected
additional compensation from Fox for the work, and
(3) Fox knew or should have known that Porter
expected additional compensation. See Davies v.
Olson, 746 P.2d 264, 269 (Utah Ct.App.1987). The
facts provided by Porter satisfy all of these elements
and are not properly controverted by Fox.
K 18 In its moving papers, Porter set forth the
following facts, with appropriate record citations:
(1) Jeff Wood, Fox's project manager, drafted the
subcontract which contains only the Included
Sections; (2) Fox repeatedly asked Porter to
perform work outside the subcontract under the
Excluded Sections; (3) Porter performed all work
identified in the subcontract as well as the requested
work under the Excluded Sections; (4) for months,
Fox reviewed and paid line-item bills from Porter
which identified the work performed, the costs of
the work, and the specific section under which the
work was done; (5) at times, Fox acknowledged that
Porter was performing
work outside the
subcontract; and (6) the total cost of the work
performed by Porter was $296,750.00, and the
amount Fox paid Porter was $135,441.62, leaving a
balance of $161,309.08.
U 19 The additional facts submitted by Fox do not
create a material dispute regarding any of the three
elements required for Porter's implied-in-fact
contract claim. Fox does not dispute that it
requested Porter to perform work under the
Excluded Sections; and Fox provides no facts to
dispute Porter's claim that Porter expected
additional compensation for the work under the
Excluded Sections. However, Fox does attempt to
dispute the third element- whether Fox knew or
should have known that Porter expected additional
compensation.
[8] H 20 Most of the facts Fox provides in its
opposition papers come from the deposition
testimony of Floyd Cox, the Vice President of Fox.
However, much of Cox's testimony is inadmissible.
Cox testifies about conversations between Wood
and Gary Porter, [FN4] as well as positions taken
by the University, regarding Porter's work under the
Excluded Sections. This testimony is inadmissible
Copr. © 2004 West. No Claim
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hearsay, to which Porter objected in its reply
memorandum and with a separate motion to strike,
and therefore it cannot create a disputed issue of
material fact. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e) (requiring
that facts set forth be admissible to defeat summary
judgment).
[9] K 21 In the relevant admissible evidence
remaining, Cox states that one Excluded Section,
"section 2300[ ], had been left out of the
subcontract;" and Wood states "that there was a
section of specifications that was left out of the
subcontract by mistake." Neither statement creates a
material dispute over whether the Excluded
Sections are part of the subcontract because they do
not explain how the mistakes occurred despite
ordinary diligence on the part of Fox. See Oliphant
v. Estate of Brunetti, 2002 UT App 375,U 21, 64
P.3d 587 (explaining that to change the express
terms of a contract due to unilateral mistake, "the
mistake must have occurred notwithstanding the
exercise of ordinary diligence by the party making
the mistake" (quotations and citation omitted)).
Also, because Fox presents no evidence that Porter
should have known about Fox's mistake either when
it entered into the subcontract or after performing,
billing for, and being paid for work under the
Excluded Sections, as a matter of law, Fox should
have known that Porter expected additional
compensation for its work under the Excluded
Provisions. [FN5]
*5 H 22 The facts set forth in Fox's opposition
papers do not create a material dispute regarding
whether (1) Fox requested Porter to perform the
work under the Excluded Sections, (2) Porter
expected additional compensation from Fox for the
work, and (3) Fox knew or should have known that
Porter expected additional compensation. Also, Fox
does not dispute the amounts provided by Porter
regarding the value of the work for which it was
uncompensated. [FN6] Therefore, the trial court did
not err when it granted Porter's motion for summary
judgment against Fox for $161,309.08. [FN7]
II. Porter's Appeal
1f 23 Porter contends the trial court erred when it
ruled the statute of limitations barred Porter's claims
against National. To make a claim upon the Bond,
Porter had to initiate its action "within one year
after the last day on which [Porter] performed labor
Oris. U.S. Govt. Works.

2004 WL 2248195
— P.3d ~(Cite as: 2004 WL 2248195 (Utah App.))
or service or supplied the equipment or material on
which the claim is based." Utah Code Ann. §
63-56-38(4) (2000). The trial court found, and
National does not dispute on appeal, that the last
day Porter worked on the Facility was May 16,
1999. Thus, while Porter's claim against Fox, which
was initiated on March 16, 2000, fell within the
one-year limit, its claim upon the Bond that named
National as a party, which was initiated on March
14, 2001, fell outside the one-year limit and
therefore would be barred.
K 24 Porter contends that the one-year limit does
not apply in this case. First, Porter argues that the
discovery rule tolled the statute of limitations
because Fox concealed Porter's claim against
National. Second, Porter argues that under rule
15(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, its
amended complaint adding National as a party and
a claim upon the Bond relates back to its original
complaint against Fox, which was filed within the
one-year limit.
A. Discovery Rule
[10][11][12] K 25 In certain circumstances, the
discovery rule tolls the statute of limitations period
"until facts forming the basis for the cause of action
are discovered." Spears v. Warr, 2002 UT 24,H 33,
44 P.3d 742. However, under the discovery rule, it
is a threshold issue whether the plaintiff knew or
should have known about its cause of action before
the statute of limitations ran. See Russell/Packard
Dev., Inc. v. Carson, 2003 UT App 316,ffi[ 16-17,
78 P.3d 616. We conclude that no legal justification
exists for Porter's delay in naming National and
making a claim upon the Bond.
f 26 Utah Code section 63-56-39 provides that
"[a]ny person may obtain from the state a certified
copy of a bond upon payment of the cost of
reproduction of the bond and postage, if any." See
Utah Code Ann. § 63-56-39 (2000). To obtain a
copy of the Bond, Porter either (1) could have gone
to the University, requested a copy of the Bond, and
paid copying fees, or (2) could have mailed a
request to the University with return postage and
payment for copying fees. See id. Instead, Porter
attempted to obtain a copy of the Bond by
requesting verbally a copy from Fox and sending a
letter to the University without copying fees or
Copr. © 2004 West. No Claim
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return postage, as required by statute.
*6 U 27 Porter's conduct demonstrates that it knew
of the Bond when it was considering litigation.
Also, even if Porter had no specific knowledge of
the Bond, as an experienced contractor, Porter
should have known that a payment bond was
required for construction of public structures, such
as the Facility, under Utah Code section 63-56-38.
See Utah Code Ann. § 63-56-38 (2000). Yet Porter
failed to invoke the procedure afforded it under the
statute to learn the terms of the Bond. Thus, despite
Fox's failure to disclose the terms of the Bond to
Porter, there was no excuse for Porter's delay in
bringing its claim upon the Bond. Because Porter
knew or should have known about its claim at such
a time that it still could have been brought within
the one-year limit, the discovery rule cannot save
Porter's claim from the statute of limitations.
B. Relation Back Doctrine
K 28 Porter also argues that the relation back
doctrine under rule 15(c) permits the filing date of
its original complaint to serve as the filing date for
its amended complaint, which would place it within
the one-year limit. National argues, and the trial
court ruled, that the relation back doctrine does not
apply to Porter's amended complaint because there
is no identity of interest between National and Fox.
1. Standard of Review
[13][14] U 29 We must first determine the
standard of review of a relation back determination
under rule 15(c). While determining whether an
amended pleading relates back seems like a purely
legal determination, the standard of review Utah
courts apply to such determinations has changed
with the posture of the case on appeal. For instance,
in Penrose v. Ross, 2003 UT App 157, 71 P.3d 631,
because the relation back issue was decided on
appeal from an order granting a motion for
summary judgment, the court applied
a
"correctness" standard, holding that "[t]he trial
court correctly determined there was no identity of
interest ... to permit relation back of the Amended
Complaint." Id. at ffi[ 7,21. However, in Nunez v.
Albo, 2002 UT App 247, 53 P.3d 2, because the
relation back issue was decided on appeal from an
order denying a motion to amend, the court applied
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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an "abuse of discretion" standard and "analyze[d]
each of the trial court's reasons for denying [the]
motion to amend in light of rule 15's liberal
standard," despite the fact that one of its reasons
was that "joining the [defendant] would be futile
[because the statute of limitations had run]." Id. at
Vi 10,20.
U 30 The difference, we think, stems from a
failure to distinguish clearly rule 15(a) analysis
from rule 15(c) analysis. In the context of a motion
to amend, the trial court has discretion to follow
rule 15(a)'s dictate that leave to amend pleadings
"shall be freely given when justice so requires."
Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a). However, where one of the
reasons the nonmoving party provides for denying
the motion to amend is that the statute of limitations
bars the claim, the analysis is not the weighing of
equitable factors under rule 15(a), but rather a legal
determination regarding whether the amendment
would be futile. See Sulzen v. Williams, 1999 UT
App 76,K 7, 977 P.2d 497 (characterizing the
appeal from denial of a motion to amend as
"challenging the trial court's apparent conclusion
that the statute of limitations had run and that their
effort to amend their complaint was thus futile");
see also Jensen v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 2003 UT 514
139, 82 P.3d 1076 (recognizing "that a court may
deny a motion to amend as futile if the proposed
amendment would not withstand a motion to
dismiss" (quotations and citation omitted)).
*7 D 31 Thus, a correctness standard applies to a
trial court's rule 15(c) analysis and an abuse of
discretion standard applies to a trial court's rule
15(a) analysis. See Wilcox v. Geneva Rock Corp.,
911 P.2d 367, 369 (Utah 1996) (treating rule 15(a)
analysis as logically prior to rule 15(c) analysis, but
reviewing the relation back issue for correctness).
This result is consistent with how a majority of
courts, including the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit, understand the doctrine. See Slade v.
United States Postal Serv., 875 F.2d 814, 815 (10th
Cir.1989) (stating that application of rule 15(c) is
"purely legal determination" that is reviewed de
novo); see also Miller v. American Heavy Lift
Shipping, 231 F.3d 242, 247 (6th Cir.2000) ("[W]e
review de novo the district court's decision to deny
relation back of an amended complaint to the
original complaint.').
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2. Utah's Relation Back Doctrine
[15] [16] H 32 Utah's relation back doctrine
developed out of the common law, under which a
party could correct a clerical error without bringing
a new action where the real parties were involved
unofficially all along, Greenfield v. Wallace, 1 Utah
188, 190 (1875), or make a "formal" change of
party by amendment, such as substituting an
administratrix for an heir where a cause of action
already brought required the administratrix as a
party. Pugmire v. Diamond Coal & Coke Co., 26
Utah 115, 72 P. 385, 386 (1903). By the time these
common law principles were incorporated into rule
15(c), [FN8] the focus had expanded to whether (1)
the amended pleading alleged only claims that
"arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence
set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original
pleading," and (2) the added party had received
notice that it would have been a proper party to the
original pleading such that no prejudice would
result from preventing the new party from using a
statute of limitations defense that otherwise would
have been available. [FN9] Utah R. Civ. P. 15(c);
see also, Doxey-Layton Co. v. Clark, 548 P.2d 902,
906 (Utah 1976).
[17] K 33 In Doxey-Layton, the first Utah case
interpreting Utah's rule 15(c), the Utah Supreme
Court held that an amendment substituting heirs for
a husband and wife who had recently died, where
the heirs had been informally involved in the
litigation from the start, related back to the original
pleading, and thus the statute of limitations did not
bar the claim. See 548 P.2d at 905-06. The Court
recognized that rule 15(c) generally does "not apply
to an amendment which substitutes or adds new
parties" because if it did, "the purpose of a statute
of limitation would be defeated," but also
recognized that "a mechanical use of a statute of
limitations [should not] prevent adjudication of a
claim" where "new and old parties have an identity
of interest; so it can be assumed or proved the
relation back is not prejudicial." [FN10] Id. at 906.
"Such is particularly valid where ... the real parties
in interest were sufficiently alerted to the
proceedings, or were involved in them unofficially,
from an early stage." Id. Where a new party had
sufficient notice that it would have been a proper
party to the original pleading, the purpose of the
statute of limitations is not defeated by applying the
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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relation back doctrine to deprive the new party of
its statute of limitations defense.
*8 K 34 The court further elaborated the relation
back doctrine in Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply
Co., 681 P.2d 214 (Utah 1984). In Peny, a general
contractor brought a breach of contract claim
against a subcontractor for defective doors the
subcontractor had provided. See id. at 216. The
subcontractor later filed an untimely third-party
complaint against the supplier and manufacturer of
the doors, in which its "only claim for relief stated
that in the event [the subcontractor] was held liable
to the general contractor [it] should have judgment
against the supplier and the manufacturer in the
same amount." Id. The court refused to apply the
relation back doctrine because there was no
"identity of interest between the original plaintiff,
the defendant, and the third-party defendants other
than privity of contract." Id. at 217.
H 35 The court then outlined the test for "identity
of interest" as follows: when "the parties are so
closely related in their business operations that
notice of the action against one serves to provide
notice of the action to the other" (Notice Transfer
Test). Id. After Perry, the notice required under the
relation back doctrine could be actual notice, such
as being informally involved in the litigation from
the start, or constructive notice under the Notice
Transfer Test. No matter how the formal test is
articulated, what is crucial is that at an adequately
early stage of the litigation, the new party was
"sufficiently on notice of the facts and claims that
gave rise to the proposed amendment." 3 James
Wm. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice § 15.19[1]
(3d ed. 2001) ("The purpose of the statute of
limitations is to prevent stale claims and the
rationale of allowing an amendment to relate back is
that once a party is notified of litigation involving a
specific factual occurrence, the party has received
the notice and protection that the statute of
limitations requires.").
f 36 In accordance with these principles, in two
subsequent cases Utah courts refused to relate an
amended pleading back where the added parties had
no constructive notice (and clearly no actual notice)
that they would have been proper parties under the
original pleading. First, in Russell v. Standard
Corp., 898 P.2d 263 (Utah 1995), the court held, in
Copr. © 2004 West. No Claim
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a libel case, that there was not sufficient identity of
interest between an Ogden newspaper on the one
hand, and the Salt Lake Tribune and the Associated
Press on the other hand, merely because they "adopt
and incorporate the same material, pursuant to
contractual agreements with one another." Id. at 265.
Second, in Dansie v. Anderson Lumber Co., 878
P.2d 1155 (Utah Ct.App.1994), this court held, in a
personal injury case involving a faulty handrail in a
new home, that there was not sufficient identity of
interest between a general contractor, a realtor, and
a realty company on the one hand and a lumber
company and manufacturer on the other hand. See
id. at 1158 n. 7. In neither case was it reasonable to
assume that notice of the substance of the claims
against the original parties served as notice to the
added parties.
*9 H 37 In two other cases, this court permitted
relation back where the new party had sufficient
actual notice that it would have been a proper party
under the original pleading. In Hebertson v. Bank
One, Utah, N.A., 1999 UT App 342, 995 P.2d 7,
[FN 11] this court stated that relation back would be
proper where the new parties (1) had actual notice
of the original pleading, which clearly described an
injury that had occurred at the time the new parties
owned the property on which the injury had
occurred, and (2) had the same insurer and attorney
as the named party, the current owner of the
property. See id. at K 19 n. 9. In Nunez v. Albo,
2002 UT App 247, 53 P.3d 2, this court permitted
relation back where the new party, a hospital, had
actual notice of a malpractice claim against one of
its doctors. See id. at K 30.
K 38 Later cases apply the same common-law test,
but articulate it in a slightly different way: "[P]arties
have an identity of interest when 'the real parties in
interest were sufficiently alerted to the proceedings,
or were involved in them unofficially, from an early
stage.' " [FN 12] Sulzen v. Williams, 1999 UT App
76,H 14, 977 P.2d 497 (citation omitted); see
Nunez v. Albo, 2002 UT App 247,1 29, 53 P.3d 2;
Hebertson v. Bank One, Utah, N.A., 1999 UT App
342,H 18, 995 P.2d 7. Thus, despite changes in
how the relation back doctrine has been articulated,
Utah courts have consistently applied the test
developed under the common law: whether no
prejudice would result because the added party had
actual or constructive notice that it would have been
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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a proper party to the original pleading.
U 39 For example, in Sulzen this court permitted
relation back where parents were named in and
served with a complaint in which their children
were "clearly identified" as the negligent parties.
1999 UT App 76 at H 15, 977 P.2d 497. Because
the children lived with the parents, the court
concluded that "it is entirely reasonable to assume
that [the children] were sufficiently alerted to the
proceedings." Id.
11 40 Therefore, in spite of terminological shifts,
the test for relation back under rule 15(c) remains as
follows: whether (1) the amended pleading alleged
only claims that arose out of the conduct,
transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to
be set forth in the original pleading and (2) the
added party had received (actual or constructive)
notice that it would have been a proper party to the
original pleading such that no prejudice would
result from preventing the new party from using a
statute of limitations defense that otherwise would
have been available.
2. Porter's Amended Pleading
[18] K 41 National does not dispute that Porter's
added claim upon the Bond naming National as a
party "arose out of the conduct, transaction, or
occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in
[Porter's] original pleading." Utah R. Civ. P. 15(c).
National is liable only to the extent Porter succeeds
on its claims against Fox, and no additional facts
would be necessary to demonstrate National's
liability other than its obligation under the Bond,
which it does not dispute.
*10 K 42 Thus, the only issue is whether National
had sufficient actual or constructive notice that it
would have been a proper party to the original
pleading before the one-year limit expired. The
focus of the trial court, and the parties below, was
on whether the relationship between Fox and
National was sufficient to satisfy the Notice
Transfer Test (constructive notice) for identity of
interest. The trial court ruled that the common
interest between Fox and National was "privity of
contract," which "as held in Perry, ... is an
insufficient identity of interest to allow for relation
back." We do not disagree, but the Notice Transfer
Copr. © 2004 West. No Claim
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Test is a test for constructive notice, and is merely
one way of demonstrating that an added party had
sufficient notice to avoid prejudice. In addition, the
relationship between National and Fox consists of
more than privity of contract.
[19] K 43 Porter argues that under the Notice
Transfer Test the relationship between a general
contractor and surety "as a matter of law ... is
always sufficiently close to meet the 'identity of
interest' standard with respect to bond claims." We
do not adopt such a per se rule. There is no reason
to infer, as a matter of law, that a general contractor
would have alerted a surety to such a pleading.
Thus, the Notice Transfer Test is not satisfied by
the general contractor/surety relationship alone.
[20] K 44 However, a consideration not addressed
by the trial court, but that could be relevant to
imputing notice to a new party, is whether it shared
counsel with a named party prior to the running of
the statute of limitations. See Hebertson v. Bank
One, Utah, N.A., 1999 UT App 342,U 19 n. 9, 995
P.2d 7 (considering having the same attorney and
insurance carrier relevant to relation back analysis).
While National and Fox currently have the same
counsel, the record does not indicate whether they
shared counsel prior to the lapse of the one-year
limit or, if so, whether the nature of counsels'
representation of National was such that imputation
of notice is appropriate. See Singletary v.
Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 266 F.3d 186, 190 (3d
Cir.2001) (refusing to impute notice where the new
party did not retain the same counsel as the named
party until after the statute of limitations had run).
H 45 Furthermore, the parties and the trial court
focused only upon the Notice Transfer Test.
Application of the relation back doctrine also would
be appropriate if National had sufficient actual
notice of the original pleading prior to the running
of the statute of limitations. Thus, we also remand
for a determination of whether National had actual
notice of the nature of Porter's claims against Fox,
and therefore against the Bond, before the statute of
limitations ran. [FN 13] See Sam Finley, Inc. v.
Interstate Fire Ins. Co., 135 Ga.App. 14, 217
S.E.2d 358, 362-63 (1975) (remanding for a
determination of whether a surety had actual notice
of the original complaint against the general
contractor after deciding that the claim upon a
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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payment bond arose out of the same facts as the
original claims).
*11 K 46 Thus, we reverse and remand for a
determination of all facts relevant to determining
whether National had constructive or actual notice
that it would have been a proper party to Porter's
original complaint.
C. Attorney Fees
K 47 Finally, Porter claims that the trial court
abused its discretion by awarding National attorney
fees in the amount of $25,000 plus costs. [FN 14]
Given our disposition of Porter's appeal, we vacate
the award.
CONCLUSION
^| 48 Because Fox did not set forth facts sufficient
to create a disputed issue of material fact regarding
Porter's implied-in-fact contract claim, the trial
court did not err by concluding that Porter was
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Therefore,
we affirm.
K 49 Because Porter's failure to bring its claim
upon the Bond and against National within the
one-year limit was due to Porter's own negligence,
the discovery rule cannot save Porter's claim from
the applicable statute of limitations. Porter's rule
15(c) claim cannot be determined as a matter of law
on the facts before the trial court. The record is
insufficient for us to determine whether National
had actual or constructive notice of Porter's original
complaint. Therefore, we reverse and remand. We
also vacate the award of attorney fees to National.
H
50
WE
CONCUR:
PAMELA
T.
GREENWOOD, Judge and GREGORY K. ORME,
Judge.
FN1. On November 1, 2003, rule
4-501(2)(B) of the Utah Rules of Judicial
Administration was repealed, and its
procedural content was moved to rule
7(c)(3)(B) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
FN2. Although we are bound by the Utah
Supreme Court's most recent interpretation
Copr. © 2004 West. No Claim
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of rule 4-501(2)(B), we respectfully note
that the rule announced by the court leaves
it unclear what remedies are available to
trial courts for a party's failure to follow
the procedure outlined in rule 4-501(2)(B).
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure states that summary judgment is
appropriate when "there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and ... the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law." Id. If compliance with
former-rule 4-501(2)(B), the procedural
content of which is currently in rule
7(c)(3)(B) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, is anything other than a mere
suggestion, then it seems that a trial court
must have the discretion to grant summary
judgment in instances where it would not
otherwise be sanctioned by rule 56(c)
alone. In other words, if failure to comply
with the rule is "harmless" as long as a
disputed fact can be gleaned from the
opposition papers, then the rule would
seem to add nothing to what rule 56
already requires.
While fashioning the proper remedy for
failure to comply with rule 7(c)(3)(B)
remains within the trial court's discretion,
see Fennell v. Green, 2003 UT App 291,1f
9, 77 P.3d 339, it currently is unclear
whether granting summary judgment,
because facts are admitted as undisputed
that otherwise would not have been, is ever
within the trial court's discretion for failure
to comply with the rule. For this reason,
and because the rule announced in Salt
Lake County v. Metro West Ready Mix,
Inc., 2004 UT 23, U 23 n. 4, 89 P.3d 155,
was in a footnote with no reference to
apparently conflicting prior case law, we
ask the Utah Supreme Court to clarify the
scope of remedies under rule 7(3)(c)(B) to
guide trial courts. See Johnson v.
Department of Transp., 2004 UT App 284,
H 7 n. 2 (concluding that facts stricken
pursuant to rule 4-501 would not have
created a material dispute even if the facts
should have been considered under the test
in Metro West).
FN3. Porter also makes
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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claims for breach of contract, breach of a
contract implied at law, and breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
However, because Porter's implied-in-fact
contract claim is sufficient to affirm the
trial court's ruling, we do not discuss these
additional claims.
FN4. The fact reads as follows: "Mr. Cox
explained that [Porter] and [Wood] had
several
conversations
about
the
subcontract between Fox and Porter about
2 issues; 1 is that there was a specification
section left out of the subcontract and 2 is
that a specification was included in the
subcontract that should have been left out."
Although any statements made by Porter
would not be inadmissible hearsay because
it would have been spoken by a party
opponent, see Utah R. Evid. 801(d)(2), no
statement is specifically attributed to
Porter in the fact submitted by Fox.
FN5. Fox also asserts that it is proper to
consider parol evidence when interpreting
the scope of the subcontract not because it
is ambiguous on its face, but rather
because the trial court accepted that
section 02680 was not part of the
subcontract due to Porter and Fox's mutual
agreement to strike the section when they
discovered that it had been included by
mistake. Fox seems to consider evidence
of this subsequent mutual agreement parol
evidence, and from this assumption
concludes that all parol evidence should be
considered to interpret the scope of the
subcontract.
However,
because
the
subsequent mutual agreement between Fox
and Porter to strike section 02680 was not
a
"contemporaneous
[or
prior]
conversation [ ], representation ], or
statement ]," Spears v. Warr, 2002 UT 24,
H 19, 44 P.3d 742 (first alteration in
original)
(quotations
and
citations
omitted), it is not parol evidence. Also, it
is not disputed in this case that section
20680 is not part of the subcontract. Thus,
Fox is mistaken that the trial court already
had considered parol evidence when it
agreed with the parties that section 02680
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is outside the subcontract.
FN6. Fox claims that the amount of
damages cannot be determined on
summary
judgment
because
Porter
identified the additional amount Fox owed
it in
1999, before
litigation had
commenced,
as
"approximately
$40,000.00" rather than the $161,309.08 it
now claims. However, the mere fact that a
plaintiff changes its damage calculation
cannot preclude
summary judgment,
otherwise summary judgment would never
be appropriate where damage calculations
become more precise as discovery
proceeds. Also, it is the nonmoving party's
obligation to present the trial court
admissible evidence to dispute the moving
party's amounts. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e).
Fox simply has not done this.
FN7. Fox also claims that the trial court
erred by awarding attorney fees to Porter,
but Fox's only argument is that the trial
court should not have granted summary
judgment in the first place. Because we
disagree with Fox on this point and
because Fox has advanced no additional
argument upon which we could reverse the
trial court's attorney fee award, we do not
address the issue further.
FN8. Rule 15(c) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure states, "[W]henever the
claim or defense asserted in the amended
pleading arose out of the conduct,
transaction, or occurrence set forth or
attempted to be set forth in the original
pleading, the amendment relates back to
the date of the original pleading." Utah R.
Civ. P. 15(c). Even though Utah's rule
15(c) does not explicitly mention the
addition
of
parties
as
has
the
corresponding federal rule since 1966, see
Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c), Utah's rule nonetheless
embodies the same common law doctrines
embodied in the federal rule regarding the
addition of parties. See Doxev-Layton Co.
v. Clark, 548 P.2d 902, 906^ (Utah 1976)
(citing commentary on the federal rule).
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FN9. Misnomer cases, such as Greenfield
v. Wallace, 1 Utah 188 (1875), are now
analyzed under rule 15(c), and the analysis
focuses upon whether there was sufficient
notice to the real party of interest so that
"relation back is not prejudicial." Wilcox v.
Geneva Rock Corp., 911 P.2d 367, 369
(Utah 1996) (quotations and citation
omitted) (permitting relation back where
the plaintiff had served the correct
defendant, Geneva Rock Products, Inc.,
but had named the defendant in the
complaint as "Geneva Rock Corporation");
see Sulzen v. Williams, 1999 UT App 76,1}
30, 977 P.2d 497 (where a complaint
misnamed a parent as guardian, rather than
the child by and through the parent as
guardian, relation back was permitted
because service on the parent was legally
sufficient for service on the child, the child
clearly was identified in the body of the
complaint, and no prejudice would result).
FN 10. This point is consistent with
interpretations of the corresponding federal
rule. See 3 James Wm. Moore, Moore's
Federal Practice § 15.19[3][c] (3d ed.
2001) ("A court may find notice is
adequate if there is a sufficient 'identity of
interest' between the new defendant and
the original one so that relation back will
not be prejudicial.").
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existing parties.' " (quoting Perry, 681
P.2d at 217)). The shift in terminology,
however, has not affected the substance of
the doctrine, but does explain the trial
court's failure to focus upon whether
National had actual notice of the substance
of Porter's claims against Fox.
FN 13. There are some indications that
National did have actual notice. For
example, Fox's president testified that the
relationship between Fox and National was
extremely close: "They pretty much knew
when I cut my fingernails, yes."
FN 14. While Porter challenges the
reasonableness of the award, it does not
challenge the trial court's statutory
authority to award reasonable attorney fees
and costs to the prevailing party, in this
case National, to a "suit upon a payment
bond." Utah Code Ann. § 63-56- 38(6)
(2000).
2004 WL 2248195 (Utah App.), 510 Utah Adv.
Rep. 3, 2004 UT App 354
END OF DOCUMENT

FN11. While Hebertson v. Bank One,
Utah, N.A., 1999 UT App 342, 995 P.2d 7,
involved analysis of the savings statute, the
court explicitly adopted the test under rule
15(c) and applied it to the facts of the case
to reach its savings-statute holding. See id.
at H 18.
FN 12. The shift in terminology appears to
stem
from
the
Russell
court's
misinterpretation of Perry as holding that
identity of interest, a test for constructive
notice, is a necessary, rather than a
sufficient, condition for relation back. See
Russell v. Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263,
265 (Utah 1995) ("[R]ule 15(c) does not
apply to amendments that add new parties
'who have no identity of interest with
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